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ARTICLES
A SENATE OF FIVE: AN ESSAY ON
SEXUALITY AND LAW
Paul D. Carrington*
I. EXPOUNDING ON SEX. THE AUTHOR'S QUALIFICATIONS
I don't know a lot about sex.1 That is part of my point.
Despite my lack of qualifications on this important subject, I was
asked to address it in 1986. The request came from a group of fed-
eral judges whose ignorance of the subject was approximately equal
to my own. Their ignorance is also part of my point.
I agreed to speak and I now write on the subject of our mutual
ignorance because, after all, on the subject of sex if no other, any
writer or speaker can hope to hold an audience for at least a little
while. And, on this subject if no other, one can freely assume that a
reasonable reader will not expect any author to know very much
about his or her subject.2
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. BA. (1952), University of Texas; LL.B.
(1955), Harvard. This Article is a revised and annotated version of the John A. Sibley lec-
ture delivered at the University of Georgia School of Law on November 16, 1988. I am
grateful to Katherine Bartlett, Robert Burt, Kenneth Karst, Robert Post, and Carl Schnei-
der for comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful for the reference help of Mary Car-
rington Coutts of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University. Persons inter-
ested in the subject of this paper may be served by the information that the Institute
provides reference help to all; for help, call 800-MED-ETHX. Research support was pro-
vided by the E.T. Bost Fund of the Duke University School of Law.
' This lack of expertise creates a dilemma with respect to the documentation of this pa-
per. Heavy documentation makes a paper by such an author seem falsely to be the product
of scholarship that has been long-sustained, broad and deep. On the other hand, light docu-
mentation risks passing off as original ideas that have been fully developed by others. I have
tried to take a middle course, hoping that the reader will keep in mind that the author is, on
the subject of sex, decidedly amateur. The purposes of most of the citations are merely to
acknowledge prior work and to make it available to the interested reader, and not to cloak
any of the conflicting views presented with the authority of other authors.
2 Perhaps especially so if the author is a lawyer. After all, only lawyers would think of
using their automobile bumpers as an approach to a sexual encounter. Has anyone really
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It was also a part of my willingness to address this subject that
when I was a child, I was not permitted to discuss sex in public. It
may be this experience that scarred my character with repressed
needs. Perhaps, I thought, my repression might be relieved and my
character healed by a belated self-indulgence. One treatment
seemed not to help, but I persist in the hope.'
Despite this disclaimer of general expertise, I would not like
readers to think that I am wholly without qualification to address
my subject. I do have professional experience in the field that
should be disclosed not only as a qualification but also as a possi-
ble disqualification, because when you read of it you may conclude
that this paper is not the product of disinterested scholarship.
What you must be told is that I am indeed a major expert on one
aspect of the law of sexual morality.4
In 1969, a troop of players brought a play to Ann Arbor under
the auspices of the Michigan Union. The tour was suffering from
an unfortunate lack of attendance until, on the eve of their arrival
in Ann Arbor, they informed the public that future performances
would be staged in the buff. They succeeded in attracting thus a
sizeable audience in Madison, Wisconsin and also the attention of
the Ann Arbor prosecutor, who informed the student hosts and
their faculty advisor that he would arrest any nude players appear-
ing on the stage of the Michigan Union. I was summoned as a civil
liberties lawyer to the urgent conference conducted prior to the
performance. At that conference, the producer of the company
hugged their lawyer lately?
3 Moreover, I have now had two years to think about what I should have said when first
asked about sexuality and law. As a law student, I was prone to reflect on the good answers
to examination questions that occurred to me a day late. Likewise, as a lawyer, my best
arguments usually occur to me after the decision has been rendered. It is only as a lecturer
that one sometimes has the chance to make use of such belated reflections, and so, for this
reason, too, I chose to revisit the topic on the occasion of the Sibley Lecture.
" In claiming expertise on the basis of a single experience, I adhere to a family tradition.
When my father started practicing law in Dallas in 1919, there was a neighboring lawyer who
was identified by the sign in his window as an expert on piano law. The lawyer explained
the sign with the datum that he had repossessed more pianos than any lawyer in Texas.
Very soon, my father was called upon to repossess twenty pit toilets that were designed and
manufactured for public use by some northeastern firm that had not been paid their price.
The toilets had been sold to and installed in the City of Port Arthur, which was dissatisfied
with their quality and so had refused to pay for them. These being the only such manufac-
tured pit toilets ever sold, much less repossessed, in Texas, my father ever after presented
himself to appropriate audiences as the greatest pit toilet lawyer in the history of Texas.
[Vol. 23:859
SEXUALITY AND LAW
challenged me and the even more portly faculty advisor; he said
that if the community of Ann Arbor had any respect for artistic
freedom, then the two of us should be willing to prove it by going
on the stage nude with the players. I need not tell you that I ad-
vised him that such an act would compromise my professional dis-
interest, and that I must therefore decline, entirely out of respect
for my profession, of course. I did, however, in lieu of the re-
quested form of support, undertake to write a brief in his behalf
were he to be prosecuted. He was prosecuted, and I did write that
brief. After three years of close study of my brief,' the court dis-
missed the prosecution against him and seventeen members of the
cast.
And so here I present myself as the most successful nudity law-
yer in the history of Michigan, winner of dismissals for eighteen
defendants, those eighteen being almost all the defendants ever
prosecuted in Michigan for public nudity.
II. THREE IMPULSES
I come to the subject of sexuality and law with at least three
related but sometimes conflicting impulses, each of which is proba-
bly at least sometimes shared by most readers. Indeed, I suggest
that these three impulses are shared, albeit in varied mixes and
sometimes in combination with others, by most Americans.
My first impulse, and the one that most often predominates
when I am confronted by other persons' sexuality, is to mind my
own business. Like many readers, I sometimes practice voyeurism,
but I never approve of it, and I aspire to respect the privacy and
autonomy of other individuals. Whatever pleases other folks ought,
if possible, be permitted them. This impulse surely derives in part
from my membership in a society driven by market capitalism that
celebrates individual autonomy and the pursuit of private interest
in the making of market decisions. It is an impulse intensified by
the awareness that modern science has created, and will continue
to create, extraordinary new options for individuals. The morning-
after pill6 is only the most recent of a series of developments that
5 It may be pertinent to note that the successful brief advanced no constitutional argu-
ments, but only a close reading of the Michigan statute which made it possible to distin-
guish between intrusive nudity and an exposure to an appreciative audience.
6 For a brief description of the drug, an anti-progesterone, see Gianelli, RU 486, Drug
1989]
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have heightened our awareness that many of our ideas about sex
are merely quaint. Individuals now have choices heretofore denied
us, and we ought generally to exult in new freedoms.
A second impulse, perhaps no less worthy than the first, is a re-
vulsion at exploitation. I do not like to see the strong take unfair
advantage of the weak in any context, even though I confess I
might have taken an advantage or two in my time. This impulse is
surely linked to my. membership in a society deeply influenced by
values inculcated by the Judeo-Christian faiths.
Perhaps on account of my Protestant-Victorian upbringing, tak-
ing advantage of strength is especially revolting to me when the
object of the exploitation is a sexual favor. The linkage of power
and money with sex is not simply an offense to the autonomy of
the weaker partner. Sexual exploitation is also a corruption of the
spirit of the exploiter, cheapening not only the sacred mysteries of
life, but also the values of fidelity and integrity that are required
for community and national life.
My third impulse is to acknowledge that in matters of sex, there
are secondary and tertiary consequences of conduct to which par-
ticipants are often especially insensitive, being even more than
usually preoccupied with self and partner as they are. In fact, sex-
ual relations are no more independent of external consequences
than are employment relations. Our sexual conduct, even when it
is wholly consensual and well hidden from nonparticipants, can
have substantial effects. These effects may be felt by other sexual
partners, past, present or future. They may be felt indirectly by
other members of the society of which we are a part, whose rela-
tionships may be weakened or strengthened by what we do. Espe-
cially are the effects felt by children, primarily but not exclusively
by our own children.
My attention to these external consequences of sexual conduct
derives not from my political, economic, or religious predilections
and associations, but from a longstanding interest in the diversity
of human culture. While societies have differed greatly in defining
"normal" conduct, there appears to be no culture that has not re-
garded sex as a proper and necessary subject of regulation.7
Used to Cause Abortion, Stirs Debate, AMl. MED. NEWS, Jan. 9, 1987, at 51, col. 1.
Even the Samoans are not without many strong sexual taboos. See D. FREEMAN, MAR-
GARET MEAD AND SAMOA. THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL MYTH (1983).
[Vol. 23:859
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The reason for the universality of sexual mores is that there is a
universal need to inculturate or socialize our most powerful and
potentially most destructive emotions, in order to limit or direct
the external effects of the sexual conduct of members of a society.
It is an insight that has been universally shared by men and
women on all continents and of all cultures that sexuality must be
channelled for the good of all. Accepting this reality, I must ap-
prove at least in principle the idea that some social constraints on
sexual conduct are necessary and proper even for our own culture.
Respect for privacy, revulsion at exploitation and recognition of
the need for constraints do not always sit well together. In daily
life one can integrate them, generally minding one's business while
lending support to those who are overborne by others, and making
occasional moral judgments that are limited to measuring right
conduct at particular times and places and that are not held to
account for consistency.
When one attempts to think about sexual mores as legal sub-
jects, integration is more difficult. If one is to justify or criticize the
criminalization of abortion, prostitution, sodomy or rape by a
spouse, one is required to address issues more broadly, with more
finality and subject to closer accountability than is comfortable.
That is also true when one considers the legal aspects of sexual
relations at the workplace, surrogate motherhood, no-fault divorce,
and making fathers pay. Indeed, the sexual lawmaker must con-
sider a set of factors that need not intrude on curbstone pontifica-
tions, such as the prospects for obedience, the cost and effective-
ness of enforcement, and the possibilities of even-handed
administration.
Hence, as I prepared to address this subject, I have found myself
trifurcating8 My opinions divide irreconcilably along three lines
and I imagine three quite different legislative programs, each re-
flecting one of my impulses, and each also rooted deeply in our
culture. I visualize three wise state senators, each concerned not
only with her own re-election, but also with freedom, with social
justice, and with the future welfare of the society she servesY
s That is not, if any under-employed prosecutors are among the readership, a confession
of illicit sexual activity.
9 I have limited myself to lengthy discussion of only three ideological senators. Obviously,
there could be many more. As it happens, these three seem sufficient to disclose the uncer-
1989] 863
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These imaginary senators are all idealogues and advocate conflict-
ing ideologies, with a purity strongly suggesting that they hold
"safe seats." These politicians compete within my mind for my al-
legiance. I find myself in agreement sometimes with one, some-
times with another. Because these ideologies are in conflict, I am
not myself able to maintain a coherent view of the subject.
In making my senators female, I do not presume to make them
spokespersons for feminism. Gender justice is an important sub-
ject, but it is not the subject of this paper.10 My topic is not gen-
der; it is sex. The two are obviously linked, but they are not the
same.
11
III. THE LIBERTARIAN
Let my first imaginary Senator be known as a member of the
Sexual Libertarian Party. She is animated by a keen concern for
the rights of individuals to make their own choices. She derives
many of her thoughts from John Stuart Mill,' 2 and perhaps indi-
rectly from Jeremy Bentham s and Adam Smith.14 With Mill, she
tainties in my own mind. Moreover, it is not my purpose to cause any reader to adopt the
platform of any of these three senators, but only to induce greater respect for their differ-
ences and for the legal consequences of those differences.
10 My own views of gender justice are close to those expressed in D. KIRP, M. YUDOI & M.
FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE (1986). The authors of GENDER JUSTICE take the view that public
policy and gender are tightly intertwined and that gender influences policy making at all
levels of each branch of government.
11 Indeed, I do not intend by imagining my senators to be women to suggest that their
views are those of any particular women. In addressing my topic, all my imaginary senators
must form their thoughts in the mind of a male person, one born in Texas in 1931, a Demo-
crat, a law professor, and an Episcopalian at that, supported and sometimes managed
through thirty-six years of marriage by a very able and tolerant wife, a parent to seven
children and children-in-law and grandparent to four. Given this limitation on the world
view of my senators, they must be forgiven if each is less than true not only to feminism,
but even to the views of any identifiable subgroup of women. Yet my hope in supposing
them to be women is that they will each be perceived to have at least some preferences that
are those of at least some thoughtful women. I strive as best I can to present a view that is
not centered on my own male experience of fifty-seven years.
12 Especially J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
'3 See generally J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEoIS-
LATION (Methuen ed. 1982).
14 See generally A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF TIHE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R. Cambell, A. Skinner, & W. Todd eds. 1976) (6th ed. 1791); MORAL AND POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY (H. Schneider ed. 1948) (6th ed. 1790). Cf. G. STIGLER, TiiE CITIZEN AND THE
STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975) and THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER, AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1982); see also R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
[Vol. 23:859
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believes that the only justification for the use of official power is to
prevent harm to individuals.15 She accepts the recently celebrated
argument of Charles Murray16 that government intervention has
caused much of our society's ills, both economic and social.
The Libertarian is skeptical of the claims of those who profess to
see in sexual conduct a threat of harm to others. She suspects that
persons expressing such fears are merely disguising in a cloak of
benign purpose their desire to impose their prejudices on their fel-
lows; she regards them as moral imperialists. In this, she shares the
premise of much modern psychoanalysis that guilt and duty are
forms of tyranny over the minds of individuals that should be dis-
pelled as quickly and thoroughly as possible.17
In conflict with sexual moralists, she believes that our own deci-
sions are best for each of us. Further, individual decisionmaking
serves the public interest, which is best discerned through the un-
seen hand of the market of ideas and values, and which unfolds in
the flowering of billions of individual choices.
The Libertarian is prone to reinforce these views with the asser-
tions that law is largely impotent to deal with matters of sexual
morality,18 and that the effects of such laws are to diminish respect
for the law,19 waste the energies of law enforcement institutions, 0
and make the management of proscribed sexual activities more
profitable.21 She therefore believes keenly in "de-criminalization"
of sexual conduct.
The Libertarian's conception of good sex was formed while read-
ing Margaret Mead's description of sexual relations in Coming of
15 J.S. MILL, supra note 12, at 74-75.
"I C. MURRAY, LOSINGROUND: AMERIcAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984). The author
argues that we tried to provide for the poor but produced more poor instead, and that in
trying to remove the barriers to allow escape from poverty, we inadvertently built a trap.
1 On the degree to which the language of therapy has shaped American expectations
about interpersonal relations, see R BELLAH. HABITS OF THE H.ART INDivlDuAuSm AND COM-
MrrtENT IN AhmwcAN LIFE 128-39 (1985).
18 For an expression of this premise and others of libertarianism from another age, see
Carrington, The Moral Quality of the Criminal Law, 54 Nw. UJ. Ray. 575 (1959).
19 "If we make criminal that which people regard as acceptable, either nullification occurs
or, more subtly, people's attitude toward the meaning of criminality undergoes a change."
H. PACKER, THE LibuTs OF THE CIUMINAL SANCTION 359 (1968). See also Skolnick, Coercion
to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL L REv. 588 (1968).
20 Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 161 (1967).
21 N. MORRIS & G. HAwKiNs, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIE CONRoL 5 (1970)
(discussing misguided conception of capacity of criminal law to influence people).
1989]
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Age in Samoa, where, according to Mead, men and women freed of
the sexual hangups customarily imposed by western cultures en-
joyed one another's bodies freely without incurring emotional en-
tanglements.2 2 The Sexual Libertarian imagines the no-entangle-
ments, one-night stand as the zenith of gratification and therefore
the favored form of sexual activity.
From such premises, the Sexual Libertarian reasons in support
of the further liberalization of marriage law. Each individual in a
relationship should be acknowledged to control it, and this means
termination at will. She subscribes to the dictum of Kenneth Karst
that relationships are enriched by the freedom to leave them as
one may please, for this adds meaning to "the decision to stay."'
The Sexual Libertarian is mindful of the work of psychologists
who urge that women may tend to have less need and desire for
individual autonomy than men.24 But she is inclined to think that
any such feminine impulse to share and nurture is a product of
culture, not nature, and that its cure can be found in the right kind
of psychoanalysis, perhaps coupled with more sex. She views the
desires of many women to encumber themselves with children as
benign indications of weakness.25
If people wish to incur obligations to one another by contract,20
22 Mead's work was published in 1929. The modem reader should be wary of this work. It
was Mead's doctoral dissertation and bears the stamp of work designed to please her men-
tor, Franz Boas, who sent his students around the world in search of proof that nurture, not
nature, is all. For a critique of the book, see D. FREEMAN, supra note 7. For a review of the
social "science" literature which Boas and his students aspired to rebut, see S. GOULD, Tim
MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
' Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 638 (1980).
24 E.g., L. MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIF-
FERENT VOICE& PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982).
22 Commentators have asked whether it is not unjust to be a woman. Given that feminine
disabilities are derived from reproduction, and given that reproduction can be done artifi-
cially, is it not unjust that new technologies are not made available to all women? Parenting
could be left to those who want to do it. See FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTICS OF SEX (1970) for
an elaboration of this view. See also A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A
FREE SocIrY (1988):
What gives human life its special value is that it can be an experience in which
persons find happiness and satisfaction through self-directed participation and
contribution. Lives spent bearing and rearing children and without adequate
solitude and seclusion from others are stunted lives .... [S]uch lives may be
lives of sacrificial contribution, but they are lives that fall short of those that
might otherwise have been.
Id. at 96.
26 See Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
866 [Vol. 23:859
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the Sexual Libertarian would allow it even though she might ques-
tion their wisdom in forbearing future pleasure. But she would be
disinclined to enforce long-term obligations implied from short-
term relaionships. Making fathers pay for a couple of decades2" on
account of a year or two of enjoyed intimacy seems to her an un-
justified imposition on the right of individual fathers to dispose of
their money according to their own impulses.28
Women who want long-term support should, in her view, bargain
for it in prenuptial agreements, or even in contracts made with
their husbands who want them to accommodate male desires, such
as the desire for children. Such contracts she would enforce as
market decisions freely made.
Likewise, she sees nothing wrong with surrogate motherhood,29
but instead sees it as a triumph of modern science that enables
unhappily childless couples to escape childlessness and the surro-
gate mothers to perform a service that is valuable to others. In-
deed, she would encourage surrogate motherhood services for
women who wish to be parents but who do not wish to be bur-
dened by pregnancy."' Absent some duress in the negotiation, she
regards a contract of surrogate motherhood as having the same
moral claim to enforcement as any other exchange of promises. To
deny enforcement of a surrogate motherhood contract freely made
is, in her view, a degradation of the autonomy and rights of the
surrogate mother, a form of patronization that was abandoned for
men in the fourteenth century.
The Sexual Libertarian of course favors the legalization of sod-
omy and prostitution and any other form of "safe" sexual con-
duct-conduct that is not immediately and demonstrably harmful
CAI. L REv. 204 (1982); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change,
62 CALIF. L Rxv. 1169 (1974); cf. G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (examining
the family through a theoretical economic framework).
2 See generally D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY. THE ENFORCEmENT 0 CILD SUP-
PORT (1979).
Cf. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICIL L
Rxv. 1614, 1626-34 (1982) (discussing possible changes in compulsory child support laws).
29 Accord In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987). This current topic has
evoked a considerable amount of literature. See, e.g., Andres, The Aftermath of Baby hIt
Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER REsP., Oct-Nov. 1987, at
31 (1987); Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CA. L Rsv. 939 (1986); Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal
Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE LJ. 187 (1986).
10 See supra note 25.
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to those who engage in it, including even perhaps controlled sexual
violence between consenting adults or sex with animals. That
money is involved is not a concern to the Libertarian for she can
accept prostitution as one means of fighting the war on poverty;
prostitution is welfare that the state does not pay.31 Whatever
pleases individuals or brings them recompense sufficient to over-
balance their displeasure is by her lights deserving of protection,
not constraint, unless other persons are demonstrably harmed or
put at risk by the activity in question. 2
The Sexual Libertarian also, of course, favors the right of the
mother to an abortion and the introduction of the morning-after
pill. These. seem to her necessary recognitions of the right of
women to individual autonomy.
The Sexual Libertarian is a bit ambivalent about sex in the
workplace or the academy. Her reservations derive from concerns
about secret and unjust preferences in otherwise open competitions
and reductions in the productivity of labor caused by workplace
romance.33 Fairness to competitors in the marketplace and atten-
tion to the obligations of employment are all that she would ask;
given these, she has no objection to dalliance among colleagues, or
between teacher and student. She supposes that Heloise was prob-
ably made a better student by the special attention she received
from her teacher, Abelard. 4
The Sexual Libertarian is not an absolutist, of course; she would
favor certain limited protections against sexual use of children too
young to consent. She would protect adolescents from the induce-
ments of the pimp or the baby-seller. She might also favor a prohi-
bition of polygamy as a kind of sexual antitrust law. She does not
necessarily approve of all of the sexual conduct which she would
protect. While she might not approve of Hustler magazine, she will
fight for the right of women to make their own decision to pose for
1, A. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 172. See generally R. SYMANSKI, THE IMMORAL LANDSCAPE:
FEMALE PROSTITUTION IN WESTERN SOCIETIES (1981).
52 Cf. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for
the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1979) (presenting moral
argument as opposed to efficiency-based argument for decriminalization of prostitution).
The problems are usefully enumerated by Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 843-61 (1988) (examining sexual relation-
ships at school and work).
The story is told in THE STORY OF ABELARD'S ADVERSITIES: A TRANSLATION WITH NOTES
OF THE HISTORIA CALAMrrATUM (J. Muckle trans. 1964).
[Vol. 23:859
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it. 3 5
The Sexual Libertarian position celebrating individual autonomy
as the superior value is surely consistent with many of our most
deeply shared values. She would better the world by allowing sex-
ual relations to be governed by individual selection in much the
same way that we propose to enrich ourselves by opening our mar-
kets to the free flow of goods. This is a morality that is congruent
not only with capitalism, but also with the political traditions of
democracy, embracing both individual freedom and equal rights to
self-advancement.
IV. THE SocIAIST
Let my second Senator be known as a Sexual Socialist. She likes
to make her own choices as much as the rest of us. But she recog-
nizes individualism as a possible shield for brutality and exploita-
tion, and almost always as an apology for greed. As part of this
recognition, she regards her Libertarian colleague's constituents as
characters from The Bonfire of the Vanities." She draws intellec-
tual nourishment from Marx,3 7 but also from such diverse artists
as Jane Austen 3S and Henrik Ibsen. 9 With Edmund Burke, she is
unwilling to celebrate freedom of choice until she knows what peo-
ple will do with their freedom.40 If she must choose, as Tocqueville
foretold,41 between the values of individualism anl egalitarianism,
she votes for equality.
Cf. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON OBSCENrrY AND PORNOGRAPHY 51
(1970); Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKin-
non, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 130 (1984) (expressing concern over Professor MacKinnon's
proposal to deal with pornography by invoking the power of government to suppress it).
' Thomas Wolfe's 1987 novel depicts a city of individuals animated almost wholly by
greed and Hollywood sexuality. The antiheros do manifest occasional sympathies for their
own children.
Or, perhaps it is Engels. See generally F. ENOELS. THE ORIGINS OF TnE F .my. PUvATE
PROPERTY AND THE STATE (1884). See also H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION, A Pmo-
SOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO FRAUD (1955).
1 Reference to the relationship between sexuality and power can be found in EMAA
(London 1816), MANSFIELD PARK (E. Rhys ed. 1906) (2d ed. 1816), PME AND PREUDICE (E.
Rhys ed. 1906) (3d ed. 1817), and SENSE AND SENSmILtry (E. Rhys ed. 1906) (2d ed. 1813).
See generally . BROWN, JANE AUSTEN AND HER WORLD (1966).
3 Ibsen was much concerned with abuse of power in sexual relations. See especially A
DOLL'S HousE (1890), GHOSTS (1881), and HEDDA GA LER (1879).
40 SELECTED WirrINGS OF EDMUND BuRKE 346 (IV. Bate ed. 1975).
41 II A. DE TOcQuEvnas DEMOCRACY IN AMmcA 94-98 (P. Bradley ed. 1945) (12th ed.
1989]
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The Sexual Socialist, like the Sexual Libertarian, is essentially
optimistic, but she believes that improvement in the human condi-
tion comes not from the unseen hand of the market but from wise
intervention by the democratic state.42 She believes in the possibil-
ity of a social order in which sexual relations, like other relations,
can be genuinely improved for the benefit of almost all, and that
the law has a significant role to play in achieving this betterment
of the human condition.
The Sexual Socialist is inclined to see traditional family law as a
means by which male-dominated cultures disable married women.
In this respect, she, too, celebrates John Stuart Mill, but as the
champion of the rights of married women.43 She sees traditional
suburban motherhood as a prison for women. She is inclined to
agree with Simone de Beauvoir"" that the law should force women
out of these relationships and out of the home in order to protect
them from exploitation. With Kate Millett,45 she takes the willing-
ness of some women to submit to suburban motherhood and
housekeeping as mere proof of the conditioning that blinds them
to their own exploitation.
She believes that many of our less attractive characteristics such
as greed and excessive ambition are nurtured by traditions of sexu-
ality that emphasize and reward the wrong impulses. 48 With Chris-
topher Lasch,47 'she thinks that sex is better in a just society peo-
pled with sensitive persons who are not in perpetual pursuit of
self-interest. In these ways, sex and politics are related.
She therefore earnestly hopes to construct a society which fea-
tures sexual relationships that are benign. To this end, she would
abandon the forms of family relationships that she finds repres-
42 She may get her economics from A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (First Ameri-
can Press Inc. ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1832). In any case, she shares Senator Moynihan's negative
views of the wisdom of Charles Murray, supra note 16. See D.P. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND
NATION 128-44 (1986).
43 J.S. MILL, THE SUBECTION OF WOMEN (S. Coit ed. 1911) (1st ed. 1869).
44 Sex, Society and the Female Dilemma: A Dialogue Between Simone de Beauvoir and
Betty Friedan, SATURDAY REVIEW, June 14, 1975, at 12, 18.
45 Quoted in Howe, The Middle Class Mind of Kate Millett, in READINGS ON THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF WOMEN 181, 184 (J. Bardwick ed. 1972).
46 I take this as one theme of C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); cf. Bartlett,
MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CALIF. L, REV. 1559 (1987) (reviewing
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED); see also R. SAMPSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER (1965).
47 C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977) and THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM
(1979).
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sive. She favors radical reform of marriage laws as a means to pro-
tect married women against the drudgery imposed upon them by
their overbearing husbands who accept the benefits of family but
not the burdens. She would replace the hierarchical family with
new kinds of groupings that feature equal rights. She would in a
word, "say yes to sex and no to power."' 8 She hopes that the social
order thus created will be so civil, so gentle, so mutually gratifying,
that the society nurturing such relationships will be the envy of
the world, causing other societies to modify their unhappy sexual
mores to emulate our superior ones, perhaps even producing a
world more unified and less given to destruction and violence. To
use Carol Gilligan's metaphor4 9 she hopes to better the world by
making it more a web and less a ladder.
The Sexual Socialist has a quite different vision of the kind of
sexual relations she wishes to favor. She regards the Libertarian's
sexual hopes and expectations to be a product of Hollywood im-
agery of romantic sex, an imagery that is itself the product of com-
mercial greed. She favors sexual relations between peers of equal
status and authority in the relationship, neither of whom derives
anything from the relationship but sexual gratification. 0 She is, of
course, indifferent to the gender of the sexual partners.
She would prohibit all sex between persons having a hierarchical
relationship, for the reason that such sex is inevitably exploitative.
Similarly, she would readily punish the use of physical force in
connection with sexual acts, even if those who experience force or
violence consent and are gratified by it. Submission to hierarchical
sex is, to her, a sin.
Thus, this Senator vigorously seeks the complete abolition of the
marital exception to the crime of rape. 1 Even if largely for rhetori-
cal flourish, she joins Martha Chamallas52 in questioning whether a
wife should not be entitled to revoke consent to a particular sexual
48 Cf. M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 157 (1978).
49 C. GILLIGAN, supra note 24, at 62.
50 Cf. B. EHRENREIGH. RE-M AING Lova THE FE&MuNzATiON OF SEX (1986); see also
Chamallas, supra note 33, at 835-43 (examining an egalitarian ideal of sexual conduct).
5 Most states immunize husbands unless there is a legal separation or violence or a
threat of violence. I Eu:asN, P. Kumvz, & A. STANroN, FAMmjny LAW. CASES, TEXT, Poawz;
131-47 (1986) (discussing liability for spousal violence); see also Note, To Have and To
Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARv. L REV.
1255, 1258-60 (1986) (discussing continued vitality of marital rape exemption).
52 Chamallas, supra note 33, at 816-18.
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act, and thus expose her husband to criminal sanctions if he should
fail to withdraw in mid-coitus if ordered to do so.3
The Sexual Socialist feels no constraint about making fathers
pay. Because the father usually enjoys a higher income, and espe-
cially because that higher income may result from unjust advan-
tages derived from biology as well as culture, she favors strong ac-
tion to compel redistribution to needful mothers, and even some
not so needful as long as the effect is to equalize the living condi-
tions of the absent father and his offspring.
She perceives homosexuality to be a disadvantaged status like
that of being a woman or a black. She therefore regards the sup-
pression of homosexual activity to be unjust. She strongly supports
equal rights for gays and lesbians.
The Sexual Socialist strongly opposes prostitution, 4 pornogra-
phy" and surrogate motherhood 56 as inescapably exploitative rela-
tions between the strong and the weak. With respect to prostitu-
tion, she favors criminal punishment of the male consumers of
services so degrading to the providers.57
The Sexual Socialist is especially concerned with sex at the
workplace and sex in the academy. In her view, a work supervisor
or teacher who enjoys sex with a supervisee or student is engaged
in a thinly disguised transaction of prostitution. Because such sex
is exploitative, it does not matter to the Sexual Socialist who initi-
ates the sexual contact. Sexual harassment and sexual bribery are
53 Cf. R. v. Kaitamaki, [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (holding that the question of whether a
woman consented to intercourse is not to be determined solely with reference to time of
penetration). But cf. People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1985) (when
female initially consents to act of sexual intercourse, but thereafter withdraws consent, each
subsequent uncontested penetration accomplished by force or" fear will constitute an act of
rape).
14 Accord Arrington, On Respect, J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 1 (1978).
15 See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985); R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW (1984); cf. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (1986) (discussing problem of pornography and desirability
of maintaining neutral viewpoint in first amendment adjudication).
51 Cf. S. O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L.
REV. 127 (1986) (rejecting argument that state prohibition of surrogacy violates parties' con-
stitutional right of privacy).
5' See generally M. O'BRIEN, ALL THE GIRLs (1982) (series of stories concerning one man's
relationships with various prostitutes).
18 See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN - A CASE OF
SEx DISCRIMINATION (1979); B. DZIECH & L. WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR (1984).
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equally submissions of sexual favors for favors of another kind, and
so they offend her egalitarian principle of sex for its own sake for
all concerned. She would even-handedly punish both partners, the
strong one who exploits and the weak one who submits or bribes.
She regards the castration of Abelard and the banishment of
Heloise to a nunnery as harsh sanctions, but not misdirected.
V. LIBERTARIANISM V. SOCIALISM
Both the Sexual Libertarian and the Sexual Socialist are essen-
tially optimistic about the coming improvement of the human con-
dition, and both emphasize the value of the individual. The Social-
ist's emphasis on equality is consonant with individualism in
assuring its benefits for those likely to be victims of unconstrained
self-advancement. If not quite congruent with market capitalism,
her values have nevertheless long coexisted with market capitalism
as features of our culture.59
While the Sexual Libertarian and the Sexual Socialist share
long-term ends, their preferences with regard to means are not rec-
oncilable. The Libertarian's prescription for the Socialist's preoc-
cupation with exploitative sex is more sexual freedom. The Liber-
tarian also has a lingering sense that all hierarchy is not necessarily
bad, and that an exchange of sex for wealth could in some circum-
stances, as in the marriage of a very attractive female to an elderly
but wealthy male, be a very fair bargain.
Several matters divide these Senators sharply. They divide on
the legalization of prostitution and pornography. The Libertarian
supports surrogate motherhood; the Socialist opposes it. The So-
cialist is hot in pursuit of fathers who are fugitives from parental
responsibility; the Libertarian is laggard. Their approaches to the
regulation of sex in the workplace and the academy are divergent
and inconsistent.
At the same time, the Libertarian and Socialist Senators are
comfortably allied on several matters. Both are strong in their re-
jection of religion as a consideration. They agree that marriage re-
lations should be easily terminable, and that wives are entitled to
protection against rape by their husbands. They agree that the
59 D. BEuL, THE CULTUn CONTRADIaMONS oF CAPrrAus 223 (1976) (arguing that a so-
cialist market economy is feasible and could possibly run more efficiently than the tradi-
tional market economy).
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choice to have an abortion is that of the mother alone. They agree
that sexual preference is not a fit subject of regulation. Thus, while
coming to their conclusions from quite different routes, their posi-
tions often coincide.
VI. THE TORY
I describe my third Senator as a Sexual Tory. She, too, has read
and admired the work of Adam Smith"° and John Stuart Mill 1
and Karl Marx, but on matters of sex and morals, she is more
taken by the writing of anthropologists, especially of Bronislaw
Malinowski 2 and Margaret Mead.63 She is also influenced in im-
portant respects by the work of Sigmund Freud. 4
The Tory supports individual freedom, but regards the Liberta-
rian as blind to many indirect and long-term adverse consequences
resulting from unconstrained sexuality. The Tory also supports so-
1' Smith, it may be recalled, held his chair in moral philosophy, of which economics be-
came a branch. A taste of Smith's morality was expressed in THE THEORY OF MORAL SEN'I-
mrErs 28 (D. Raphael & A. MacFie eds. 1976) (6th ed. 1790): "Though naturally the most
furious of all passions, all strong expressions of [the passion by which Nature unites the two
sexes] are upon every occasion indecent .... 
1 The Tory especially admires Mill's later work, in which he became an advocate of fam-
ily values. E.g., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 117-18 (1873). In maturity, Mill
rejected the "felicific calculus" of Bentham; he became persuaded that happiness was best
achieved through sacrifice for others. For a career, he commended "some art or pursuit,
followed not as a means, but as an ideal in itself. Id. at 106. Cf. J.S. MILL, ON SocIAL FREE:-
DOM (D. Fosdick ed. 1941). See generally B. SEMMEL, JOHN STUART MILL AND THE PURSUIT OF
VIRTUE (1984).
62 B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); THE FATHER IN PRIMI-
TrvS PSYCHOLOGY (1927); FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION (1944); SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE
SOCIETY (1927); SEX, CULTURE AND MYTH (1930) (hereinafter B. MALINOWSKI, CULTURE).
63 M. MEAD, CHILDHOOD IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURES (with M. Wolfenstein, 1955); CUL-
TURAL DISCONTINUITIES AND PERSONALITY TRANSFORMATION (1954); CULTURE AND COMMIT-
ETE- A STUDY OF THE GENERATION GAP (1970); FAMILY (with K. Heyman, 1965); GROWING
UP IN NEW GUINEA (1930); MALE AND FEMALE, A STUDY OF THE SEXES IN A CHANGING WORLD
(1949); see also R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE
CULTURE (1946) (hereinafter R. BENEDICT, CHRYSANTHEMUM); and PATTERNS OF CULTURE
(1934).
U, Freud's writing illuminates the relationship between individual sentiments and exter-
nal influences. See, e.g., S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (J. Starchey ed. 1961)
(1st ed. 1930). In practice, however, Freud's influence has often been anathema to this sena-
tor, for psychoanalysis has contributed to the development of a widely shared view that
guilt is unhealthy, that one should not be judgmental, and that parents should pursue their
own happiness at whatever cost to their children. See M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE
IN WESTERN LAW 107-08 (1987) (discussing relationship between no fault divorce laws and
psychology of divorce).
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cial justice, but regards the Socialist as blind to biology and the
needs of the social order to regenerate itself. If required to choose
amongst the three, the Tory reluctantly favors the values of the
family over those of individual freedom and social justice.
A. A Tory View of the Libertarian and Socialist Positions
The Sexual Tory is skeptical about applying theories of individ-
ual rights in the context of sexual relationships to foster a spirit of
sexual license. She cautions those who may mistake solitude and
isolation for freedom,65 for she regards Libertarian sexuality as
likely to be a lonely and unsatisfying indulgence. More impor-
tantly, she holds that individual freedom implies the right to make
long-term commitments that will be respected and protected by
the social order." Freedom thus also implies individual responsi-
bility, not only by the individual actor, but also by others. It is not,
in her view, an appropriately protected exercise of individual rights
to participate in the destruction of the relationships of others.
While not unconcerned with happiness here and now, the Tory
favors deferred gratification in the form of sexual forbearance to be
repaid in the future happiness of our offspring.67 She accepts the
teaching of J.D. Unwin that "civilization" has never been achieved
except by the sacrifice of individuals willing to forebear gratifica-
tion of their sexual as well as their other desires in order to secure
the public good.6 To put her sexual policy in the economic terms
often employed by Libertarians, she favors a program of invest-
ment to one of consumption.
The Sexual Tory also believes with the Socialist in social justice
"E.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDoM 31-32 (1967).
In this, she respects the educational function of the law: commitments not enforced are
prone to become commitments not respected by the society. See M. GLENDON, supra note
64, at 6-7, 107-08.
" An economist might view this as a form of sexual investment. The Tory's preference in
this regard brings her into sharp conflict with Justice Blackmun, whose views she regards as
hedonist- "[W]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals, not because of a preference for stereoptypical households." Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (dissenting opinion).
"J.D. UNWIN, SEX AND CULTURE (1934). Patrick Moynihan shares the view that the "way
in which [Unwin's] work has been ignored 'sometimes seems positively sinister.' "D.P. MOy-
NniAN, supra note 42, at 192 (quoting D.R. Johnston); see also S. FaEUD. C nzx0N AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (J. Starchey ed. 1961) (1st ed. 1930); M. W EanR, THE PROTESTANT Emic
AND THE SPmrr oF CAPrrALst 166-67 (T. Parsons trans. 1930).
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and equality. Her special concern, however, is social justice for the
weakest members of our society: our children. Equal rights for
adults that come at the expense of our children come, in her view,
too dear. She is willing for adults to experience not only sexual
repression, but also other disadvantages, if that is what it takes to
assure effective nurture of children.
The Sexual Tory's world view is more dour than those of her
senatorial colleagues. She does not share the Libertarian faith in
the capacity of the unseen hand of the market to produce social
and sexual relationships which are optimal. Neither does she sup-
pose with the Socialist that better men and women are likely to be
produced if only our society were more just, or engaged in more
redistribution of money or power. To the contrary, Tory thinking
begins with the premise that men and women are more like other
animals than they are like angels, and that careful attention is
needed to bring out their better instincts, if indeed this can be
done at all. The Sexual Tory is thus less concerned with the re-
mote possibility of uplifting human nature and establishing new
and higher moral standards for the world than she is with protect-
ing those we have.
The Tory's world is one that is well-stocked with terrors, one in
which not merely civility but civilization is a temporary and fragile
condition that can be maintained only at considerable risk and sac-
rifice. She believes that a primary aim of any social order must be
its own survival, and that even the values of the Sexual Libertarian
or the Sexual Socialist are not likely to be preserved for a society
that does not protect and replenish itself.
The best and perhaps essential institution for preserving and
transmitting any culture and its values is, in the Tory view, the
family. It is in the family, she believes, that children learn most of
what they need to know in order to cope with social life, to appre-
ciate the values of their culture, to cherish and protect it. Although
supportive of public education and child care, she has little confi-
dence in the ability of public institutions to compensate for
shortfalls in the performance of families in this regard.7
The Tory would therefore deploy the law to reinforce the insti-
ll Cf. W. DURANT & A. DuRANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 91-94 (1968) (examining the
growth and decay of civilization).
70 On the issues of child care, see D. FALLOWS, A MOTHER'S WORK (1986).
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tutions and relations of family to the end of preserving a culture in
which individual rights and social justice can flourish. Because her
program is less frequently recognized in contemporary public dis-
cussions as a coherent and purposeful one, I will enlarge more fully
on its implications for law.
B. The Social Need for Fatherhood: The Testosterone Problem
The Sexual Tory, true to her view of humans as animals, pro-
claims that male chemistry poses a primary social problem. She
does not suppose that men enjoy sex more than women, but, that
as a rule, they are more powerfully driven toward it.7 1 Particularly
in the period of young adulthood, when the sap is highest, she per-
ceives males to have an unruly and intense preoccupation with sex
which resembles that of other male mammals. While not prepared
to endorse Aristotle's rating of the human male as the most sala-
cious animal in nature save for stallions, she would rate him right
up there with bulls, tomcats, billy goats, and other studs. She sus-
pects that this chemistry is linked to other male traits having pri-
meval biological functions, such as the propensity for physical vio-
lence7 l2 which may be useful when the family, or the society, is
exposed to external threat.7" She reckons that the flow of testoster-
one poses problems in ordering any stable society, but especially
one that is a fit shelter for the gentle values of individualism and
equal justice advanced by her senatorial colleagues.
The Sexual Tory perceives the family to be the means by which
cultures everywhere have coped with this problem. At the same
time that the family is the primary agent for transmitting to the
next generation the values of the culture, such as a regard for indi-
71 The Tory is at risk of having a daughter like Jill Tweedie who "was brought up in the
diffuse but all-embracing belief that inside every male was a seething volcano of sex, a
churning stream of lava kept under control only by dint of iron discipline on the man's part
and extreme caution on mine." L BLOM-CooPFR & G. DREWRY. LAW AND MOAuTY 140
(1976).
1 She agrees with Elizabeth Stanton that men are "destructive brutes," but not necessa-
rily that women are "small-minded ninnies." E GRiFFrr, IN HER OWN RIGHT. Tim LFE oF
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 205 (1984). There is not much doubt that Stanton was right about
the men. See J. WILSON & R. HE.NsTEIN. CRMIME AND HumN NATURE 104-25 (1985).
73 This Tory is a pessimistic pacifist. Even if America is "kinder and gentler" and the
Soviet Union pursues glasnost forever, she supposes that more young men will have to suf-
fer the gruesome consequences of war. She tries to reckon this in her calculus of equal rights
as she weighs the rights and interests in the family.
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vidual rights and equal justice, it is also the primary means of tam-
ing antisocial impulses, particularly of males. It is not a unique
discovery of our culture that testosterone and its consequences are
most effectively controlled by channeling males into family rela-
tionships in which they share responsibility for developing in chil-
dren those traits and values we most need and most esteem. Let
us, she urges, accept the teaching of many (perhaps all) cultures
and blunt the aggression of overheated young males by engaging
them in the task of making their children more literate, more nu-
merate, and more agile, and also more kind, more generous, more
compassionate, more tolerant, more respectful of the rights of
others, and even more willing to sacrifice their very lives if neces-
sary for the protection of others. 4 This engagement or commit-
ment of men to the welfare of children has been achieved by defin-
ing a role for the father that is respected and rewarded.
If effectively engaged in the rearing of children and the trans-
mission of culture, fathers may also lend emotional and moral sup-
port to their wives, strengthening them in both capacity and re-
solve to do for the children what needs to be done. In return for
that contribution to family, fathers may derive additional strength
for themselves based on their own sense of self-worth. Since chil-
dren generally inherit the self-assessments of those who nurture
them, and derive pride in themselves from the respect that parents
show to one another, their capacities to contribute as adults to the
social order of which they are a part should be materially en-
hanced. Pride in parentage, she believes, is likely to become pride
in community and nation.
In the Tory view, positive political and economic consequences
derive from the habits of mind common to parents who are com-
mitted to the development of their children. Such persons, she be-
lieves, are far more likely to make the long-term investments
needed to accumulate capital and to support political programs
that favor investment rather than consumption of goods and ser-
vices.7 5 It is not parents who are the political constituency for mas-
sive deficit finance by the government.
The Sexual Tory reasons thus that the first duty of any parent
" For a recent compilation of cultural comparisons, see THE FATHER'S ROLE: CROSS-CUL-
TURAL PERSPECTIVES (Lamb ed. 1987).
75 Cf. A. ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988).
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to his or her child is to love and support the other parent, even if
the cost of doing so is an enormous sacrifice of sexual freedom and
a risk that the distribution of benefits and costs may prove in the
end to be uneven. In performing that duty to their children, par-
ents also perform a public duty by enhancing the socialization of
those children to the values of a society that sustains individual
freedom and equality.
A culture that dismisses its males from the responsibilities of fa-
therhood would be not merely unique in human experience, 71 the
Tory holds, but also dangerous and unhappy. Such a culture asks
to have its streets populated with violent young men, its adoles-
cents runaway and awash in chemicals,7 its work force depreciated
in value, and its children faced by a grim future of increase in
these effects. Such a culture will get what it deserves. 8
In developing her views about the importance of family, the Sex-
ual Tory is a bit of an empiricist. She is familiar with the data
generated by decades of school studies, which may confirm that
one predictor of a child's school performance is the stability of the
child's family.7 9 She has also examined the crude science of crimi-
nology which tends to demonstrate that the absence of effective
family nurture is a primary source of the violence which so mars
our social life.8 '
7' "[Flreedom of intercourse though not universally is yet generally prevalent in human
societies. Freedom of conception outside marriage is, however, never allowed... ." B. MAu-
NOWSKFI CULTURE, supra note 62, at 63-64.
See generally B. ROBINSON, TEENAGE FATHERS (1988) (discussing scope of adolescent
pregnancy problem, particularly as it affects the teenaged father).
78 This judgment is made not only by my Tory, but by Senator Moynihan as well
From the wild Irish slums of the nineteenth century eastern seaboard, to the
riot-tom suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson in American
history. a community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in
broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship
to male authority, never acquiring any rational set of expectations about the
future-that community asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disor-
der-most particularly the furious, unrestrained lashing out at the whole social
structure-that is not only to be expected; it is very near to inevitable. And it
is richly deserved.
Moynihan, A Family Policy for the Nation, AMERcA, Sept. 18, 1965, at 280, 283.
7 This aspect of the school data seems to have been understudied in the last decade. For
a review of the literature, see P. ADAMS, FATHERLESS CHILDREN (1984).
80 For a survey of the material linking family breakup to social violence, see J. WILSON &
R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 245-53; cf E. CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIE: AN AMERICAN
CHALLENGE 181-221 (1985) (discussing relationship between families and crime). The most
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She also draws support from the experience of different ethnic
groups in America. She is inclined to believe, with Martin Luther
King"' and Patrick Moynihan,82 that our failure to integrate blacks
more fully into American life is in substantial part a result of our
inability to develop and maintain black family traditions to replace
those destroyed by slavery or by its aftermath. She attributes the
great success of recent migrations to our country from such diverse
places as Cuba and Vietnam to the stability of families within
those migrating groups.s3 Finally, this Senator has travelled in the
Far East where she observed great social dynamism, which she at-
tributes in part to the great strength of family ties that confirm the
roles and self-worth of Asian males.84 While she would not and
knows that we could not replicate Asian family life in America (ex-
cept perhaps by massive immigration), she protests laws and poli-
cies that deny this wisdom of Asian culture. 85
For these reasons the Sexual Tory, while cherishing individual
rights and equality, would, if forced to choose among the three,
prefer the values of family. She believes that sexual mores uphold-
ing the family meet even the John Rawls' test of justice,80 for their
benefits flow not only to those who share family relationships, but
to any who share in the culture nourished by them. So she con-
substantial anthropological study seems to be Bacon, Child & Berry, A Cross-Cultural
Study of Correlates of Crime, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291 (1963), which finds a
causal link between violent crime and father-son intimacy. See also B. WHITING, J. WHITING
& R. LONGABAUGH, CHILDREN OF SIX CULTURES (1975).
81 "(F]or no other group in American life is the matter of family life more important than
to the Negro. Our very survival is bound up in it. .. ." Address by Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Abbott House (Oct. 1965), quoted in D.P. MOYNIHAN, supra note 42, at 37. See also Norton,
Restoring the Traditional Black Family, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 2, 1985, at 93. The Tory is
especially taken that Martin Luther King shared her submission to the influence of Mali-
nowski. See D.P. MOYNIHAN, supra note 42, at 169 (citing King's favorable reference to Mali-
nowski in the Abbott House address, supra).
82 D.P. MOYNIHAN, supra note 42.
'S See, e.g., L. FUCHS, HAWAII PONo: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1961); R. GARDNER, B. ROBEY & P.
SMITH, ASIAN-AMERICANS: GROWTH, CHANGE & DIvERSITY (1985).
" See, e.g., J. WILSoN & R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 452-57. Compare the earlier
perceptions of R. BENEDICT, CHRYSANTHEMUM, supra note 63, at 290-91.
81 European nations are more attuned to the problem than we are. See generally M,
GLENDON, supra note 64.
8O J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971). Rawls' theory of justice is based on main-
taining a social contract that free and rational persons, concerned only with furthering their
own positions, would accept.
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cludes, with all past humanity, if Malinowski is to be believed,87
that every child should have a father.
C. Other Intrinsic Benefits of Sexual Mores
Although finding these functional justifications for sexual mores
associated with the preservation of the family to be ample, the
Sexual Tory also perceives through her amateur anthropologist's
eyes that standards of sexual conduct have additional intrinsic
worth independent of these functions.
These added benefits are three. First, it is a human instinct,
widely if not universally shared, to gain individual identity by ref-
erence to a group of which we are a part. To be an Ifugaoan or a
Sunni or a Quaker is to exist by a code of conduct associated with
that cultural identity. Sexual conduct, being as important as any
conduct in which we engage, is generally at the heart of those
codes that give us that culturally derived identity. In this way, in-
dividuals adhering to the sexual mores of their culture may receive
benefits even if those mores do not serve the particular interests of
those individuals.
Second, the Tory asserts, sexual mores of almost any kind pro-
vide us with a basis for forming expectations about the sexual be-
havior of our fellows, expectations that may be at least as impor-
tant to many of us as those protected by the law of contracts or of
property. Even for those not shy, a culture having no sexual code,
if such can be imagined, would be frightening for most members of
our species, who would be thereby deprived of much social
contact.8
Third, sexual mores give to individuals norms of conduct that, as
Lon Fuller has taught us,"' are essential to the exercise of freedom.
Their total absence would be a form of unfreedom because mem-
bers of such a "liberated" culture would have no basis for choosing
identities as individuals. They would lack, for example, a culture
See B. MLowsKI, CuLTURE, supra note 62, at 63. "The most important moral and
legal rule concerning the physiological side of kinship is that no child should be brought into
the world without a man-and one man at that-assuming the role of sociological father,
that is, guardian and protector, the male link between the child and the rest of the commu-
nity." Id.
See, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89 Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HRv. L Rsv. 1305, 1311-13 (1955) (dis-
cussing necessity of social norms for making individual choice effective).
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against which to rebel when rebellion is the choice to be exercised.
The point may be made metaphorically by imagining a person hav-
ing the choice at all times to be male or female, pregnant or sterile,
parent or childless. Such a person would be imprisoned by the ab-
sence of any premise from which rational choice might proceed,
being helpless even to reject itself in order to aspire to become dif-
ferent than it is.
Thus, for these additional reasons, the Tory is unashamed to ad-
vocate constraints that may sometimes conflict with individual in-
terests or with the perceived requirements of equal justice.
D. The Tory Program: Holding Marriages Together
Acknowledging that the causes of the low estate of the American
family are many,90 the Sexual Tory challenges the law to do all
that it can to correct the strong and deplorable trend. She is thus
an advocate of the rights of children to enjoy stable family rela-
tions.91 To the degree necessary to protect children, she rejects the
premise of Kenneth Karst that "the freedom to go gives added
meaning to the decision to stay. '92 Such a "freedom" she regards
as harmfully destabilizing not only directly, but also indirectly, be-
cause it induces both partners to maintain emotional defenses
against the day when the other spouse finds grass greener else-
where. Children are entitled to parents who are committed, not
free.
Rejecting also the defeatist premise that the law cannot influ-
ence sexual behavior or social forces,9 she insists that we have not
really tried to influence marital sexual conduct with the more so-
phisticated tools that we have developed in the arena of commer-
cial regulation. She knows that the law has many instruments for
the advancement of the family that have not yet been deployed.
The Sexual Tory's program differs greatly from those of her sen-
90 See generally K. KENNISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESo
SURE 3-23 (1977).
" In this, she subscribes to the premise of the current Alan Arkin film, Necessary Parties
(PBS television movie, Nov. 5 & 12, 1988), that children have a right to continuity and
stability in family relations that is more important than the rights of adults.
92 Karst, supra note 23, at 638.
93 E.g., REP. OF THE COMM. ON HoMosExuAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN
REPORT 48 (1963) (recommending that private consensual adult homosexual conduct not be
a criminal offense).
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atorial colleagues. It centers on the interests of children, not
adults. It celebrates married sex as the preferred outlet for the sex-
ual drive, especially for the parents of children. Her program is to
offset the centrifugal social forces that are pulling families with
children apart with an array of legal incentives for families to stay
together.
She would use every available legal means (save perhaps the
criminal law) to encourage, require and protect the commitments
of parents to young children and to one another. To this end, she
would deploy the laws of marriage and divorce, taxation, welfare,
property-even creditors' rights-and, especially, torts.
The Tory would begin by repudiating the doctrine of "no fault"
divorce for families with minor children.s' A parent bearing re-
sponsibility for breaking his or her children's home would be liable
to the children not only for support, but for punitive damages."-
She would also put such strength in the parental support enforce-
ment program that no parent could gain any possible financial
benefit from the abandonment of his or her children and spouse.e
The first half of any income earned by a noncustodial parent any-
where in America, and elsewhere that its law can be made by
treaty to reach, would be used to support his or her minor chil-
dren.97 She would thereby re-establish the teaching of the law that
nurture and preservation of the family bond is a duty owed by par-
ents to their children and to the public."
Mary Ann Glendon has pointed out that "no fault" divorce was not the product of a
political judgment that no moral obligation to remain in an inconvenient marriage exists.
Instead, "no fault" reflects only the realization that inquiry into issues of fault is ugly and,
in our federal system, ugly issues are avoidable by movement to the least constraining juris-
diction. M. GLENDON, supra note 64, at 112-42.
95 She would thus reverse the consequences of poverty visited on mothers and children by
the "divorce revolution." See generally Weitzman, supra note 26.
" This would also be a material change in existing practice. See D. CHAMas, supra note
27, at 42-58 (examining financial position of a family after divorce).
In this, she rejects the predictions offered by David Chambers in his article on compul-
sory child support, supra note 28. Cf. M. GLENDON, supra note 64, at 109-11 (criticizing
Chambers's conclusions regarding the law and child support payments).
98 The Tory thus has no doubts where Martha Minow is uncertain that "perhaps the
reformers went too far in pursuing a version of freedom that underestimates the dependence
of freedom itself on interpersonal connection." Minow, Consider the Consequences, 84
MIcFL L REv. 900, 918 (1985) (commenting on L WmrzbtAN, THE DivoncE REVOLtmON Tm
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOWsC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
(1985)). Minow agrees with Weitzman's view that child support should be based on an ap-
proach that is likely to equalize the standards of living between custodial and non-custodial
19891
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The Tory would apply the concept of fault in making custody
awards. To protect the more caring parent from a bad bargain re-
sulting from the other parent's threat of a custody battle, she
would eliminate judicial discretion and provide a legal right to full
custody for any parent who has borne the primary burden for the
care of a child whose custody is disputed unless grave misconduct
can be proved by the divorcing partner.99 A noncustodial parent
responsible for breaking a marriage would be presumptively dis-
qualified from custody and would forfeit even visitation rights un-
less granted as an act of grace by a court for the benefit of the
child.100 The Tory's law would hope for a stepparent to displace
fully the forsaking parent, to enjoy with the nurturing parent,
among other things, such financial support as the forsaking parent
is capable of providing.
The Tory would also make full use of the Internal Revenue Code
as an instrument of this family policy. Adverse tax consequences
would result from any divorce affecting children. 101 This could be
accomplished (1) by allowing double exemptions for children living
with two parents or a widowed parent, (2) by conditioning and
measuring the interest deduction for a home on the number of mi-
nor children living in it, and (3) by treating all support payments
households. Minow, supra, at 917 (citing WEITZMAN, supra, at 379-83).
" M. GLENDON, supra note 64, at 99-102; R. NEELY. THE DIVORCE DECISION THE LEGAL
AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF ENDING A MARRIAGE 62 (1984) (discussing child custody as-
pects of divorce); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 972-73 (1979) (noting "[t]he prevailing best interests standard exacerbates the dis-
advantages of a risk-averse parent because of its great uncertainty"). But see Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477,
561-63 (1984) (suggesting that rule giving custody to primary caretaker may not be rule
most reasonable to adopt, since there is no firm evidence showing this is typically in child's
best interest).
100 In this, she shares the view of J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 33-39 (1979), that children need one parent or two living together
who have unequivocal and undoubted parental authority and responsibility. But see Bart-
lett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984) (discussing
how the law should regard parent-child relationships which children form outside the nu-
clear family); Bartlett & Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the Dependency Dilemma, 2
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986).
101 Contrast the "marriage penalty" eliminated in the 1981 revision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. D.P. MOYNIHAN, supra note 42, at 187-88. For a full discussion and argument that
the tax law should be neutral with respect to marriage, see Gann, Abandoning Marital Sta-
tus as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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by a noncustodial parent as income to the custodian and not de-
ductible by the non-custodian.
Not neglecting the poor family, the Sexual Tory would substan-
tially enlarge welfare benefits for married couples living together in
relation to those available to the single parent.102 To discourage
single parenthood, she would at least partly replace the welfare
benefits presently provided for single mothers with an elaborate
system of child care, possibly modelled on the infant boarding
schools of China, with the ablest of these single mothers being
hired to work in such institutions and the others limited to weekly
visitation rights.
Also not neglected in the Tory's program is the woman of means
who would have a baby but not its father. To discourage the birth
of children out of wedlock, she would require a court to conduct a
hearing within the first month after the birth of such a child to
inquire into the identity of the father and to consider whether it is
in the child's interest to remain with the mother or with the father
or with either set of grandparents.1 03 The object would be to find
the best home for such an unfortunate child, without regard for
any rights that such a mother might imagine herself to have.
E. Adultery: A New Mission for the Law of Torts
The Sexual Tory would also use law to diminish the attractive-
ness of extramarital sex partners. If the young father is randy, he
should be urged to go home and share his sexual impulses with the
mother.
To encourage this, she would replace the old and ineffective
criminal law of adultery0 ' with a new and effective law of torts.'",
102 Cf. K GLENDON, supra note 64, at 134-38 (discussing differences between American
welfare system and Western European systems).
"I Note that this approach gives no recognition to any asserted rights of an unwed father.
See Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Be-
half of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAmi L 231 (1971); cf. In re Richard M., 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537
P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975) (holding that where father legitimated a child, he had
rights to custody equal to those of the father of any other legitimate child). But see Bartlett,
supra note 100, at 921-24.
104 For a compact and perceptive discussion of all the reasons justifying a cautious use of
criminal law, see Kadish, supra note 20.
"05 Perhaps not so new. Compare the old writ of trespass on the case to punish seduction
of a daughter. E.g., Chamberlain v. Hazlewood, 151 Eng. Rep. 218 (EY-D. 1839). See gener-
ally W. MALONE. TORTS IN A NuTsHELL INJuRES To FALULY, SOCAL AND TRADE RELATIONS
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Her primary aim in doing so is to shift the law's concern from pun-
ishment of misconduct to protection of the rights of victims."' 0 She
would impose civil liability on the sexual partner of a person who
is a parent of a minor child with another living parent, whenever
the defendant knew or could by reasonable effort have determined
that his or her sexual activity infringed on a co-parental relation-
ship. 10 7 Both the children and the forsaken parent would be com-
pensated for their anguish, and the children would be awarded pu-
nitive damages sufficient to deter repetition.
These interests would be advanced by the efforts of contingent-
fee attorneys who might exercise their first amendment rights108 to
seek out any child-clients who might be the victims of such harms.
She believes that such counsel can win the favor of American juries
for children as adultery plaintiffs as they have for personal injury
plaintiffs. What has been good for the victims of casual negligence
must be regarded as even better, she urges, for young and helpless
victims of intentional torts!
Proof of adultery as a tort would be less onerous than proof of
adultery as a crime. Discovery would not be impeded by any privi-
lege against self-incrimination.'09 The plaintiffs' attorneys might
employ aggressive contingent-fee investigators to gather useful evi-
dence. The Tory would, of course, continue to protect the privacy
of adulterers, also by means of tort law, but she would reaffirm the
present rule that evidence is not excluded merely because it was
obtained by private persons in inappropriate ways.110
78-79 (1979). The decline of such remedies is told in Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on
"Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935). See also Chamallas, supra note 33, at 810-11.
106 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that analytical distinction could be found between private consensual sexual
conduct and sexual crimes such as adultery and incest).
107 The substitution of civil sanctions for those modelled on the criminal law was my
theme in Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MICH. L. REV. 393, 409-18 (1971).
But cf. P. DEVLIN. THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALs 26-42 (1965) (examining relationship be-
tween moral law and the law of torts).
100 Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation of prospective litigants by non-profit
organization is activity entitled to first amendment protection and may be regulated by
government only very narrowly).
'09 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2018 (1970).
110 Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that evidence allegedly
seized unlawfully by federal narcotics agents could be used in a subsequent federal civil tax
proceeding); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969) (rule not al-
lowing evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure is not applicable in a
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Moreover, these children's rights would be enforced without re-
gard for the usual exemptions of assets from the bite of the writ of
execution. Nor would the liability for adultery with a parent be
insurable or dischargeable in bankruptcy. How sexually attractive,
the Tory wonders, would be an available partner whose embrace
was accompanied by a wage and bank account garnishment?
By such methods, she urges, tort law can be used as a means of
modifying sexual behavior"' in much the same way that it has
been used to modify the behavior of manufacturers of dangerous
substances and environmental polluters.
In thus restricting, sexual access of parents outside marriage, the
Sexual Tory feels obliged to concede a point to the unruly stallion;
to keep father in the house, she favors the marital exception to the
law of rape.' If father is violent, of course, she would remove him
from the home and punish him, but not merely for being too randy
on the wrong night. If mom is getting too much attention from
dad, well that's better than too little. The senator just hopes that
mother will be more gratified and strengthened than offended by
the resulting attention. If it would help to balance the injustice of
this arrangement, she would give equal rights to mothers to insist
on sexual attention when they want it. Disfavoring criminal pun-
ishment of either father or mother for either too much or too little
sexual conduct, she would, if legal intervention be deemed neces-
sary, favor making persistent sexual refusal a ground for divorce
and loss of custody.'
It is logically a part of the Sexual Tory's program to limit the
civil proceeding); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1984)
(evidence in a divorce action used to prove wife's adultery held admissible although ob-
tained by means of an illegal forcible entry into wife's home); cf. United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976) (held that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use, by
one sovereign, of evidence illegally seized by the law enforcement agent of another
sovereign).
'" See Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 SrA. L Ry. 937 (1975); cf. Car-
rington, supra note 107, at 413 ("[T]he civil-law model would give better service to the goals
of punishment than punishment itself.").
11 People v. Browning, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (holding marital exception for
criminal sexual assault is neither arbitrary nor irrational). Contra People v. Liberta, 64
N.Y.2d 152, 166-67, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574-75, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 214-15 (1984) (marital ex-
emption would offend equal protection clause).
13 E.g., Barr v. Barr, 58 Md. App. 569, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984) (husband's refusal to have
sexual relations, and subsequent departure, grounds for divorce by wife); Pfeil v. Pfeil, 100
A.D.2d 725, 473 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1984) (wife's refusal to have sexual relations lead to divorce).
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availability of attractions competing with married sex, especially
for males. She would again deploy tort law to take the profits out
of pornography and prostitution, but her preferred targets of en-
forcement would be the purveyors, not the father-consumers. Here
she thinks the class action114 may have some possibilities.
For similar reasons, she favors the prohibition of sexual activity
at the workplace and the academy 1' 5 to protect the interests of the
children of all concerned and the public interest in their welfare.
The Sexual Tory knows, of course, that this program won't work
for every family, and that some sad consequences and frustrations
would result. She is optimistic, however, that parents who are
largely dependent on one another for sexual gratification and who
will feel the weight not only of renewed moral suasion, but also of
tax, tort, and custody laws if they separate, will often find ways to
solve their personal conflicts and thereby continue to perform their
duties to their children and to the public, and, if sometimes grudg-
ingly, to one another.
F. The Tory Position on Abortion and Surrogate Motherhood
The Sexual Tory opposes abortion on demand of the mother.
While largely unmoved by the claims that a fetus has rights, she
would nevertheless provide some constraints on acts that destroy
the reproductive process, perhaps by exposing attending physicians
to liability if they fail to secure the appropriate advice.
She perceives that abortion on demand teaches prospective
mothers to think of the motherhood role selfishly. Mediocre
parenting is, she thinks, likely to be the result. Parents, she be-
lieves, should not be encouraged to think of parenthood as a status
to be pursued as an exercise of individual choice,"' but rather as
an opportunity for service not only to children, but also to the
1"4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally Dam, Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Con-
flict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975).
" She here approves Margaret Mead's dictum that there should be a taboo on sex at the
work place. See Mead, We Need Taboo on Sex at Work, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS&
RoMANrIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 54 (D. Neugarten & J. Shafritz eds. 1980).
1l Accord M. GLENDON, supra note 65, at 58-62. As Glendon observes, there are addi-
tional implications to the absolutist pro-life position as it informs other matters such as the
withholding of treatment for newborns with physical or mental defects. See Burt, Authoriz-
ing Death for Anomalous Newborns, in GENErIcs AND THE LAW 435, 436 (A. Milunsky & G.
Annas eds. 1976).
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commonweal, an opportunity that offers its own rewards and that
should not be shirked without good reasons."'
The Sexual Tory would, in approving an abortion, give some rec-
ognition to the preference of a husband if conception occurred dur-
ing marriage." 8 She acknowledges that the biological importance
of the father is very slight."9 Nonetheless, official declaration that
the married father has no rights or even interests in a fetus that
are worthy of legal consideration goes too far, in her view, toward
declaring that the father has also no responsibility to the child and
mother.. One cannot, she believes, impose duties of loyalty and ob-
ligations of support on fathers who have no recognized interests in
such decisions. If the choice to bear a child is wholly the mother's,
then financial responsibility for that child is also wholly the
mother's, a conclusion that the Tory roundly rejects.
Believing as she does in the public importance of parenthood,
the Sexual Tory is sympathetic to those who would employ the sci-
ence of surrogate motherhood. A family wanting children to nur-
ture should be encouraged, first by facilitating adoption, but also
by protecting the new methods by which one or even both parents
can sow their own seed in the body of a willing woman220 On the
other hand, the Sexual Tory would value the instincts of the surro-
gate mother who discovers her need to be the nurturing parent to
Cf. Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in THE MoRALT OF ABoRmIO LEGAL
AN HisTomcAL PERSPECTIVES 220-36 (J. Noonan ed. 1970) (analyzing the twin questions of
whether it is constitutional for the state to regulate abortion and whether it is constitutional
for the state not to regulate abortion).
118 She does not necessarily advocate overruling Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where the Court denied the right of the father to veto an
abortion. Id. at 69. But she would support the right of the father to a consultative role, and
perhaps to a brief period for reconsideration of a decision to abort. Cf. Scheinberg v. Smith,
659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981) (spousal notice and consultation requirements further integrity
of marital relationship and family).
119 Aiming thus to enhance the meager role of the father, she would not divide it, and
would make no distinction between the rights and duties of the natural, foster, or stepfa-
thers, but would assign the full role to the custodial father unless the interest of the child
clearly indicated otherwise. Contra Bartlett & Stack, supra note 100.
120 Compare S. AUSTL HEALTH COMI'N, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON IN Vrmo FR-
TILIZATION AND ARTFIIAL INSEMNATION By DONOR (1984); 2 LAW REFoRM Co z'N OF CAN.
MINISTRY OF THE ATT'y GEN, REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND RELATED
MATTERs (1985); and N.Y. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMw, SURROGATE PARENTING IN NEw Yom- A
PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMs (1987) with GR. BaRr. DE"T OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SEC,
REPORT OF THE ComtrrrEE OF INQUIRY INTO HuMAN FERTLISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (WIE
WARNOCK REPORT) (1984).
1989]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
outweigh the benefits of her contractual obligation. At least in a
case in- which the surrogate mother was inexperienced in mother-
hood at the time she made the surrogate contract, the Sexual Tory
would not enforce the contract against her but would allow her to
compete for custody on the same terms as any other unwed
mother.
G. Parental Responsbility for Child Development
It is not enough to achieve the Tory's objective that her program
keep parents living together with their children. She also means for
the law to teach both parents that they share responsibility for the
development of their children, especially with respect to their cul-
tural values and sexuality.
Parental responsibility is too little felt, the Tory thinks, because
contemporary American parents have so very little control over
their children. American parents are exceptionally weak in dealing
with adolescent children. While in all cultures there is an age lower
than the age of majority at which parental control becomes at best
an illusion, the invention and wide distribution of automobiles has
obviously lowered that age materially for Americans. Ineffective
parental control at an earlier age is cause for concern in a society
that wants its children to be inculturated to the more sophisticated
values such as respect for the rights of others.
But even for very young children, the Tory urges, parents have
little control. Television shapes the character of toddlers, infecting
them with consumerism and the social values of the entertainment
industry, particularly an appetite for romanticized sex. "Parental
guidance advised" is in the Tory's view the most cynical expression
in contemporary American usage.
Moreover, the Tory perceives that there is a kind of Gresham's
Law in cultures; where adolescents share the same environment, all
will tend to be attracted to the culture that offers the quickest and
easiest gratifications.12' On this account, the influence of the en-
tertainment industry on the values and sexuality of children has
,21 On this account, the Tory sees little wisdom in Justice Blackmun's dictum that "the
mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a
legally cognizable interest, let alone an interest that can justify invading the house, hearts,
and minds of citizens who choose to live differently." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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been magnified.
Public education was established in the nineteenth century to
enhance the American "melting pot," to create a counter-balance
to the then powerful influence of family on child development. It is
now a mere footnote to the powerful intrusion of the entertain-
ment industry on the inculturation process. Only the strongest and
most isolated of cultures is accorded a chance to resist.122 Most
parents have almost no authority to influence the development of
their children, even with respect to cultural values and sexuality.
The Tory believes this is a serious problem. She believes that
the right of parents to shape the values and sexuality of their chil-
dren is an important right much undervalued by many Americans,
especially the intellectual elite who scorn such confining values.
She perceives that the right to perpetuate one's culture is an im-
portant incentive for many and perhaps most parents. Indeed, she
suspects that the ambition to transmit one's values to future gen-
erations is one of the strongest and most widely shared human sen-
timents, ranking close to the sexual urge itself. She is confirmed in
this view by the observation that most of the civil wars conducted
around the globe since World War II find their origins in the desire
of parents to perpetuate their cultures.2 3 She notes as well that
the rights of parents are recognized by the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,'24 if not by any American constitution.
The Tory would therefore confirm substantial parental power
over their children's development, to the end that parents might at
least nourish hope that their values will be transmitted to suc-
ceeding generations, that their grandchildren may be at least
somewhat like themselves. To give parents some kind of chance,
the Tory would favor adoption of a voucher plan that would enable
parents without means to select the schools their children
122 The Amish have probably been the most aggressive group in the matter of self-perpet-
uation. See J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNriNGTON, CHILDREN IN AIISH SoclETry SoczAUzIzoN AND
COwihuNrry EDUCATION (1971). For our legal response, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1973) (first and fourteenth amendments held to prevent the state from compelling Amish
children to attend formal high school to age sixteen).
123 D. HOROwrrz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 443-71 (1985) (examining the violence of
ethnic conflicts).
124 The Declaration states as follows: "Men and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dfssolution." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 16(1) (1948).
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attend.12 5
The Tory would, moreover, acknowledge the consitutional right
of parents to withhold from public school a minor child whose
teacher espoused any sexual life style that differs materially from
the conventions espoused by the parents.12 She would therefore
affirm the power and responsibility of a school district to dismiss a
teacher for overtly maintaining an irregular sex life. 27
In addition, the Tory would recognize as a tort any intentional
act infringing on parental control over the sexuality of their chil-
dren. She would, for example, recognize the conduct formerly de-
scribed as statutory rape as a tort actionable by parents, and tor-
tious without regard to the sex or previous level of sexual activity
of the child.128 She would punish severely by means of the criminal
law a public school teacher having any sexual contact of any kind
with a student, and expose the public or private school to liability,
including punitive damages, for any negligent failure to prevent
such contact. Indeed, she is not sure that Abelard's castration was
not fully merited by his treacherous conduct.
Absent some law reform of this kind, the Tory Senator would be
uneasy about the proposed repeal of the sodomy law in her state.
She does not believe with Emperor Justinian that homosexuality
causes earthquakes, nor, for that matter, that any other gloomy
consequences flow directly from intimacies between partners of the
same sex. 129 She therefore has no interest in actually punishing ho-
mosexual conduct involving consenting adults if it occurs in pri-
vate places, since this private conduct does not threaten the moral
,2 See generally J. COONS AND S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION By CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY
CONTROL (1978).
126 Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 404 U.S. 205 (1973) (compulsory education law held unconsti-
tutional as applied to Amish children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(state statute requiring attendance at public schools held unconstitutional as violating four.
teenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law forbidding teaching
any language other than English to any child below ninth grade is unconstitutional as inva-
sion of liberty guaranteed by fourteenth amendment).
227 Accord Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (up-
holding school board's decision to not renew teacher's contract based in part on communica-
tions made by the teacher in reference to her sexual preference).
"2a Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §213.6(1) (concerning the defense of mistake as to age for the
crime of statutory rape).
2 She cannot imagine what Chief Justice Burger had in mind in saying that sodomy is
"an offense of deeper malignity than rape." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986)
(concurring) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW *215).
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superiority which she wishes to confer on married sex or threaten
the authority of parents to influence the sexual development of
their children."' 0
Yet she recognizes the virtual universality of parental ambitions
for the sexuality of their children and affirms that their hopes and
expectations in that regard are entitled to some legal recognition
and protection. She strongly suspects that "homophobia,"' 131 like
most cultural phenomena, has a functional origin in the instincts
of parents to transmit their culture to future generations. The Sen-
ator thus regards existing sodomy laws as a kind of contract be-
tween the state and young parents, perhaps especially between the
state and fathers. By its sodomy law, the state is saying to the pro-
spective spouse-parent: "If you will control your desires and re-
strict yourself to this condition of monogamy for the benefit of
your children and the future generations, we will do what we can
to assure your participation in those future generations by discour-
aging your children from relations and lifestyles which would de-
prive you of the prospect of grandchildren who know and respect
your values."
VII. TORIES v. LIBERTARIANS AND SOCIALISTS
This Tory program is, of course, denounced by Sexual Libertari-
ans as repressive of individual rights and, in the most literal sense,
paternalistic. Sexual Socialists denounce the program as anti-egali-
tarian in its special treatment of parenthood and sexist in its frank
acknowledgment that men and women are different and may gen-
erally perform somewhat different roles in their relationship. Both
Libertarian and Socialist deride the Tory concern for the alleged
testosterone problem, which they dismiss as sexist propaganda.' 31
Thus, the Tory disagrees with both the Libertarian and the Social-
ist on a number of issues including the laws promoting the stability
of marriage, abortion on request, spousal rape and sodomy.
"* In this respect, her position is that of THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 93, at 11.
13' See, e.g., Von Beitel, The Criminalization of Private Homosexual Acts: A Jurispru-
dential Case Study of a Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision Committee, 6
HUM. RTs. 23 (1977).
"' Compare Jill Tweedy's account: "The boys I grew up with absorbed this social propa-
ganda eagerly and, as a result, were often brainwashed into total sexual irresponsibility,
drunken engine drivers in charge of runaway trains with everyone colluding to blame the
drink." L BLOM-COOPER & G. DREWRY, supra note 71, at 141.
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Nevertheless, both Libertarian and Socialist have points of
agreement with the Tory. The Tory shares with both a secular ap-
proach to the subject. The Libertarian position on surrogate moth-
erhood is close to that of the Tory, although derived from different
values. The Socialist can expect support from the Tory in making
fathers pay and in the suppression of prostitution and pornogra-
phy, although again the positions are derived from different values.
Moreover, the Tory is not unwilling to make concessions. She
concedes the point to the Sexual Socialist that marriage in
America has too often resulted in an imbalance of power between
the parties. To correct for that, she would make it a feature of co-
parenthood that all earned taxable income of either parent be paid
in equal shares to each for so long as the two have minor chil-
dren. 3 This would assure the parent bearing primary custodial
duty of an equal share in the economic power of the family unit.
She is also willing to make concessions to the Libertarian. Her
program is not so prudish as to require that all other forms of sex-
ual activity be punished. The Sexual Tory has no interest, for ex-
ample, in premarital sexual activity or even in the sexual activity
of childless married couples, except insofar as the effectiveness of
the law in promoting family stability for children may be linked to
the regulation of other relationships. A culture will, she suspects,
encounter obstacles in trying to induce sexual self-restraint by par-
ents while allowing complete sexual license for non-parents. More-
over, the Sexual Tory is prepared to conduct her program almost
wholly without resort to the criminal law, and this she perceives to
be an important concession to the Libertarians.
A legislative body composed of these three Senators alone could
perhaps therefore agree on a program, if not one that is coherent.
Such a body might favor both no-fault divorce and making fathers
pay; it might provide abortion at will and enforce contracts for sur-
rogate motherhood; it might punish prostitution but not sodomy;
and it might punish a father for imposing on his spouse, but per-
haps not for imposing on his secretary.
VIII. THE SEXUAL POPULIST
As it happens, my three senators are not free to negotiate a legis-
'3 But cf. J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1981); Weitzman, supra note 26.
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lative program without considering the contentions of a fourth sen-
ator who represents a religious constituency.
This fourth senator's constituency is not represented in my owm
thinking and so I describe her views succinctly. My own Episcopa-
lian faith, born as it was to sanction the sexual transgressions of
Henry VII, 84 is heavily liturgical and makes very few demands on
the life styles of its adherents. But few religious sects can be so
described, and the fourth senator represents the serious adherents
of those religious traditions that do maintain some strict teachings
with respect to sexual conduct. Her constituents are likely to be
fundamentalist Protestants, but they might be devoutly Catholic,
Orthodox, Talmudic, or even Islamic or Buddhist. From whatever
religious text they derive their standards of conduct, they are vot-
ers who want the law to forbid sin. Accordingly, they share
strongly held views about abortion, divorce, and many of the other
topics on which I have touched.
The secular senators are tempted to dismiss this fourth as the
advocate of irrationality, thus simply to outvote her as and when
they can. They could point to the many cruelties and foolish no-
tions maintained by religious zealotry to the great harm of people
and proclaim a new era in which religious teaching is to play no
role in public affairs. However, this impulse to dismiss religion as a
source of policy is resisted by wise senators even though they deny
the religious premises of their religious Populist colleague. This is
so for three reasons.
First, religious instruction regarding sexual conduct has been
maintained everywhere and seemingly since the beginning of time.
If one is to blame religion for historic blunders, it must then be
credited with much that is positive about the times in which we
live. We are all in some sense the product of such religious teach-
ing. Individual rights, equality, and family are all ideas or institu-
tions nourished by religious traditions. At a personal level, many
secular constituents have very close relationships with supporters
of the Populist cause; they are parents, siblings, children, and
neighbors of the secular constituencies. They are therefore bound
to respect believers even if they do not share their beliefs.
Second, this obligation to respect religious belief has constitu-
134 For the story of the English schism with the Pope, see G. ELToN. REFoRm AND REFOR-
MATION IN ENGLAND 1509-58 (1977).
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tional aspects. While the first amendment is not applicable, its
premises are not irrelevant. In providing first above all else for the
protection of religious practitioners from one another, our Bill of
Rights not only acknowledged the importance of religion in regard
to public issues, it also imposed on the government a duty not to
use public institutions for secular ends if the result is to demean
religion by establishing a secular humanism as the official faith.""
There is, as Kent Greenawalt has put it, "no basis to assign a pri-
ority to non-rational, non-religious judgments over religious con-
victions,"' 36 and, in this sphere, there is little that can assuredly be
said to be "rational." My secular senators are thus constrained by
a shared sense of official duty to accord respect to the Populist and
her adherents.
Third, in facing religious populism, secular senators must weigh
practical political considerations. Each of the secular senators does
from time to time rely upon the political support of the Populist in
securing enactment of other laws not pertaining to matters of sexu-
ality. Moreover, there is the consideration of realpolitik: religious
adherents if ignored can become as unruly as other groups. 137 My
senators, as I imagine them, are not persons to bend easily to a
public opinion poll. They would accept the obligations imposed
upon them by Edmund Burke, 138 and more recently by Ronald
Dworkin, 139 to think for themselves. They would not yield to Lord
Devlin, who argued that the people have the right to punish con-
duct that they collectively regard as abhorrent, whatever their rea-
sons might be. 40 On the other hand, they perceive accommodation
to be an important aspect of their mission, and they reckon that
even the most secular of their constituents would prefer laws that
135 Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (affirming that neither the state
nor federal governments can aid religions based on a belief in existence of God against reli.
gions founded on different beliefs). But cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (state
statute which advances particular religious belief is unconstitutional as violation of first
amendment). See also Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 Duke L.J. 977 (1987).
'3' Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352, 379 (1985).
'1 Cf. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43-3 LAW & CONTEMP. PRONS. 83
(1980) (examining the Burger Court's decisions concerning sex, marriage, and the family).
131 SELECTED WRITINGS oF EDMUND BURKE, supra note 40.
139 Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 1001 (1966).
Professor Dworkin would have the legislature "test the credentials" of popular moralities.
'140 See generally P. DEVLIN, supra note 107.
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do not give greater offense to religious sensibilities than necessary
to protect genuinely important secular interests. They are there-
fore prepared to weigh and balance, to limit and qualify.
For all these reasons, the wise secular senators treat religious
populism as a political force deserving respect. They negotiate with
and accommodate its representative as well as among themselves.
This influence reduces the prospects for a coherent legislative
program.
IC THE SEXUAL REPUBLICAN
There is yet another member of this senate who will shape the
law bearing on sexuality. Because this senator is a bit of a peacock,
long on style but easily frightened, I imagine him to be male and
pretty and (Oh, I am sorry!) a Republican. He represents another
large constituency, one that is largely indifferent to any of the is-
sues of sexuality considered in this article. Indeed, his constituents
would, if they could, use the fast-forward button to get through the
fifteen second political commercials that sometimes interrupt their
television viewing. They vote for promises of peace and prosperity
and low taxes today. As long as they get theirs, they would let
others and the future take care of themselves as best they can.
As representative of this constituency, the fifth senator is prone
to flee controversy, especially about matters that some people re-
gard as very important. If asked for his position on abortion, sod-
omy, or pornography, his favorite answer is "I am all right on
that." Color this senator callow.
This senator plays a major role in lawmaking on any topic, in-
cluding sexuality. In considering how our sexual conduct is to be
governed, if it is to be governed, realism requires that we keep this
player in mind.
The American legislative process is a method of accommodating
such diverse interests and even uninterests. It is in order to compel
accommodation that our legislatures were created bicameral. Thus,
democratic legislation aims at compromise not principle; it creates
a ramshackle shelter for competing ideas and values, not a palatial
system of rights having architectural integrity. Of course, there-
fore, sexual conduct laws made by this senate of five will be a crazy
quilt that is unlikely to seem decorative to any of its members. On
this account, it is not fair to complain that our legislation is not a
coherent or rational expression of any comprehensive view of sex-
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ual rights or sexual standards of conduct.
Perhaps more serious is the concern that the democratic process
tends to deadlock, especially in confronting incendiary issues such
as those that are the topic of this paper. Deadlock may in fact be
the condition of most legislative bodies in North America sitting in
1988 to consider the range of issues from abortion to surrogate
motherhood. Even this, however, is not an unintended consequence
of our constitutional scheme, which was designed to prevent legis-
lative excess. Our process is designed to deadlock whenever the
people do not know what they want done.
X. RESOLUTION OF SEXUAL ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Because the legislative process is given to deadlock and to un-
principled accommodation of competing values, and because of the
highly visible role that our courts have come to play in our govern-
ance, it is not surprising that resort is made to the third branch
and to constitutions, state and federal, to resolve these troubling
dilemmas.
It is, of course, primarily the Libertarians who seek to pursue
their program through adjudication. As proponents of unfettered
sexuality, they hope to advance the whole of their program by con-
stitutionalizing the law of sexual mores. They celebrated a triumph
in Roe v. Wade,14 1 and they can nourish hopes that fornication,142
sodomy laws,143 and perhaps even someday, prostitution laws,144
will be swept away by constitutional edict based on the still emerg-
ing individual right of privacy.
The program of the Sexual Socialist can share in some of the
possible fruits of constitutional adjudication, but she cannot ac-
141 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989). Webster suggests that the court may be increasingly hostile to the sort of societal
goals advocated by the Sexual Liberation.
142 See Note, Fornication, Cohabitation and the Constitution, 77 MicH. L. R.v. 252
(1978) (concluding that state laws prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are unconstitu-
tional because laws are unnecessary to achieve the compelling state interest at which these
laws are directed).
143 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
Georgia's law against sodomy should have been held unconstitutional).
144 Cf. Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution
Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1235 (1976) (examining the causes of prostitution and the rationales
for retaining its criminal status). See generally A. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 169-79 (1988).
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complish her program of regulation without substantial participa-
tion of the avowedly political arms of the state governments, with
perhaps some help from the Congress of the United States. The
Tory may likewise effect some of her program through judge-made
law, albeit tort law and not constitutional law; but she, too, needs
legislative means to effect the kinds of changes in tax and welfare
law that she espouses. The Populist seems in her turn to be wholly
dependent on legislation to effect her program of punishing sin.
Constitutionalization of sexual rights in the manner advocated
by the Libertarian poses substantial problems. Some are conven-
tional problems of separation of powers that arise in any contest of
power between court and legislature. Others are problems of feder-
alism that arise in any contest between state and federal author-
ity.145 1 will not attempt a comprehensive constitutional analysis of
all these problems arising in the full range of cases that are within
the subject of this paper. I limit myself to six observations that are
generally applicable to the constitutionalization of sexual mores.
First, judges, like professors, have little professional competence
that applies to the expression or evaluation of sexual mores.
Judges cannot escape the deeply inculturated reactions to sexual
matters that form their senses of who they are. Learned legal
briefs, perhaps laced with social and economic scientific data,4
might help but, in the end, decisions among these competing val-
ues must be largely intuitive, based on little more than prejudice.
No one can reasonably regard our judges as being qualified to serve
as our moral teachers in these matters.147
1,5 See generally L. TRmF. AhimcAN CoNsTrrrtioNAL LAw, § 15-1 to -21 (2d ed. 1988)
(concerning rights of privacy and personhood).
16 On the inadequacy of the information with which to make family policy, see generally
R. MNOOKn , IN T=I IMT OF CHMDREN. ADVOCACY. LAw RE0Fon AND PuBLic PoLicY
(1985); D. HoRowrrz, Tan COURTS AND SocrAL POLICY (1977).
24 For advocacy of the role of judge as moral teacher, see Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HAv. L REv. 1 (1979). In commenting on the suggestion that our judges might
assume the role of moral teachers such as Gandhi, Christ and Socrates, Carl Schneider ob-
served that-
The cautious judge may wish to remind himself what happened to Gandhi,
Christ, and Socrates. He may wish to ask himself what qualities of character,
training, or experience equip him to use this kind of moral force. He may wish
to ask himself what consequences this kind of moral ambition has for most
people.
Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mic. L
Rxv. 919, 940 (1986).
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Randomly selected juries would be viewed by many of those gov-
erned as having a higher claim to expertise in such matters because
of their broader range of sexual experience. Judges do, of course,
decide matters of which they have equally little learning, but sex
does rank high on the list of matters of which their general igno-
rance is conspicuous. A jury also would have the advantage that its
decision is episodic, good for one case only; there is no chance that
a single jury could impose its sexual morality on the rest of us.
There is hence less need to question the authority of the jury than
there is that of our judges.
The questionable authority of judges is the second special prob-
lem in making a constitutional law of sexual rights. The absence of
any commission to our judges to control our sexuality is especially
obvious, because the textual basis in our constitutions, state or fed-
eral, for the exercise of judicial power over sex and family is espe-
cially spare.14 s Citizens and other officers of the government cannot
be easily dismissed when they question the right of judges to de-
fine our sexual mores.
Legitimacy for sexual rights must be derived from the slender
strand of decisions involving the right of privacy first acknowl-
edged in Griswold v. Connecticut.149 In its application to protect
activities of adults conducted in genuine privacy,15 0 recognition of
a right to privacy seems generally firm," for it derives strength
from the fourth amendment proscriptions against unreasonable
148 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Ob.
stetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that
decisions turning on purported Constitutional principles that cannot fairly be read into that
document frustrate the authority of the people to govern themselves). Constitutional au-
thority for the exercise of judicial power over matters of sex and family is found in other
constitutional schemes. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that everyone
has a right to respect for his privacy, family life, home, and correspondence and that this
right shall not be interfered with by a public authority except in accordance with law and as
is necessary in a democratic society).
149 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)
(stating that no right is more sacred than the right of every individual to be free to possess
and control his own person).
50 Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (reversing conviction of defendant who
had distributed samples of contraceptive foam at the close of his lecture to students).
"' See generally L. Tarsma, supra note 145. As Professor Tribe observes in § 15-21, there
is dictum in Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191, that could call into question several earlier decisions
which provide the framework for the constitutional right of privacy.
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search and seizure.11 2 As a broader proposition aspiring to protect
individuals from any of the legal constraints on sexual conduct ad-
vocated by Socialists, Tories, and Populists, the right of privacy
rests on a soft foundation. Descending as it does from an 1890 law
review article bearing on the law of torts, 15 3 and a dictum of Jus-
tice Brandeis, 154 it can find textual roots only in generous applica-
tions of the first amendment 155 or, imaginably, of the eighth116 or
ninth amendments. 57 While few knowledgeable persons expect the
Court to be slavishly bound to the text of a two-hundred-year-old
instrument, 158 the Court's more creative work should be conducted
when it can be self-confident about the positive quality of its con-
tribution to the law and the polity. It is one thing to stretch a
point when there is a strong moral consensus undergirding the
Court's actions, and quite another when that consensus is lack-
152 Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (the fourth amendment belongs as much to
the citizen on the street as to the closeted homeowner); Hardwick, 478 US. at 213 n.7
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the kinds of searches that might be necessary
to obtain evidence of sexual activity banned by statute seemed repugnant to the fourth
amendment).
'5 The concept of a right of privacy is sometimes attributed to the pioneering article of
Brandeis and Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HAv. L lav. 193 (1890), although that arti-
cle advocated a personal right to be protected by tort law, not new constitutional dogma.
' The fourth amendment, he said, implied "the right to be let alone." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (involving the secret tap-
ping of phone lines by the government and holding that obtaining and using such evidence
at trial did not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure).
"I Cf. Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that Califor-
nia's Unruh Act which entitles all persons regardless of sex to full and equal accomodation,
advantages, facilities, privileges, and services in all business establishments in California
does not violate the first amendment by requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that the first amendment prohibits
making private possession of obscene material a crime).
'5 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that
there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy but stating that the respondent might
have been able to assert such a right under the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment).
117 See Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Lib-
erty, 1985 Wis. L REv. 1305 (1985) (arguing for constitutional right to self.governance lo-
cated in the ninth amendment, to afford protection to liberties not specifically listed in the
Constitution).
I" E.g., "[The liberty [protected by] the fourteenth amendment embraces more than the
rights found in the Bill of Rights." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L
& PUB. POL'Y 91 (1987).
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ing159 as it surely is with respect to matters of sex.
Thus, the application of the right of privacy in Roe v. Wadele e
was found by many sound observers to lack legitimacy.161 Some
proponents of the result in that case have striven to make more
convincing arguments than the Court was able to muster."'2 How-
ever, even while libertarian theorists imagine its further extensions
to protect newly minted sexual rights,16 3 there remains a rankling
sense that the Court overstepped its role.164
The weakness of the authority of the Supreme Court to settle
these issues imposes on each decision a cost paid in the coin of
precious institutional political capital. In evoking political backlash
from Tories, Socialists, or Populists whose programs are obstructed
by judicial proclamations of individual rights that trump policies
made by the legislative process, the Court invites cynicism about
its own motives and intense political interest in judicial appoint-
ments which weaken public acceptance of its moral leadership with
respect to those matters for which it has clear responsibility.""'
Third, even if there were an appropriate judicial role with re-
spect to sexual policy that might be implied from our constitu-
tional scheme, it is especially difficult to assign that role to federal
judges. Article I of the Constitution confers no responsibility for
family or sex on the Congress of the United States. While the Con-
gress has, in such fields as welfare and taxation, taken sex and
16 Thus it is that the Court has often invoked Tory values of concern for the institutions
of the family while expressing the right of privacy. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
160 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161 E.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 28 (1975) (questioning whether the abor-
tion question should have been left to the political process); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 53-55 (1976) (noting that the Court substituted its
judgment in place of the result of the political process); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST'. A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvi w 43-73 (1980) (examining fundamental values judges use in deci-
sion making); Monoghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 396 (1981) (discussing
Supreme Court's efforts to nullify political process on basis of general principles not derived
from Constitution's text or structure).
12 E.g., Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); M. PEARY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97-103 (1982); Nichol, supra note 157.
161 But see A. ALLEN, supra note 25 (acknowledging development of American tort, statu-
tory, and constitutional privacy law).
'" E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-23 (White J., dissenting) (finding no support in
the Constitution for overriding state abortion statutes); C. SCHNEIDER & M. VINOvSKIS, Tie
LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION (1980).
165 The problem of legitimacy may be viewed somewhat differently in those states in
which judges stand for election, and are thus accountable for their hubris.
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family into account, it is clear that if any responsibility is left to
the states by the federal constitution, this is it. Thus, considera-
tions of federalism combine with considerations of separation of
powers to magnify doubts about the legitimacy of rights estab-
lished by generous implication from the Constitution of the United
States.
State legislatures especially need authority to deal with sex and
family to maintain their credibility as players in our constitutional
scheme. Because our sexual mores are central to our social life and
have such pervasive influence on the quality of our communities
and our individual lives, state legislatures cannot be generally dis-
empowered to regulate them without significantly weakening their
ability to control other forms of conduct having less consequence
to the social order and carrying less moral opprobrium than our
sexual conduct. Indeed, it may not overbear the point to say that
the power to legislate with respect to sexual mores is the paradigm
of powers "reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'6
It is thus the ultimate right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, a
right conferred on state legislatures.
Fourth, with respect to matters of sex, there is a prudential con-
cern, reinforcing a constitutional scheme placing primary responsi-
bility on state legislatures, that lies in the wisdom of allowing di-
verse local cultures to flourish. If there is any sphere of public
discourse in which the Brandeis dictum celebrating the states as
social laboratories167 has current worth, it is surely the sphere of
sex regulation. Ignorant as we collectively are in the face of the
modern technology of sex, it is quite possible that we can learn
from experience in the social laboratories of the states. There may
yet emerge other and better accommodations among the competing
moralities.
This consideration is especially important at a time of rapid
2 US. CONST, amend. X.
1 In the words of Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibil-
ity. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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technological change that challenges all our assumptions about the
consequences of sexuality. This is no time to foreclose speculation
and adaptation. In the matriarchy to which I am subject, the re-
sponsibility for nurturing children in these troubling sexual issues
is assigned to the grandfather. This assignment is made for the
apparent reason that his views on such matters are likely to be
given the least weight by the coming generation. For them, these
problems will abide, but in forms yet unannounced, calling perhaps
for responses not yet imagined by any of us. Constitutionalization
of sexual rights precludes diversity and thus experimentation in
these matters.
Fifth, there is the additional prudential concern, also reinforcing
the consitutional prerogative of state legislatures, that any organ of
government making broad decisions with respect to sexual matters
needs to take into account considerations of realpolitik. For that
reason, it should be able to negotiate its resolutions and to make
accommodations as circumstances appear to require. This is not
the kind of lawmaking that results from constitutional adjudica-
tion;18 8 it as, as this article illustrates, precisely the kind of law-
making that can be expected to result from legislation.
Thus, a few years ago, Thomas Grey made an argument' 60 for
constitutionalizing the protection of homosexuals against the
threats of sodomy law on the basis of a suggested need to prevent
violence and control the gay community. His utterance was made,
however, before the Right-to-Life movement hit the streets in
force."' Extended to the present situation, his argument would
lead to reconsideration of Roe v. Wade in order to still the crowd
in the street. Perhaps later its reinstatement would be called for
when the Right-to-Life mob retired in satisfaction and was re-
placed by an equally angry feminist mob demanding a judicially
18 Illustrative of the "non-negotiable" position that tends to characterize constitutional
rights is the statement of Justice Blackmun: "[T]he mere knowledge that other individuals
do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest, let alone an
interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to
live differently." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
188 Grey, supra note 137, at 97.
170 See generally R. LIEBAN, R. WUTHNOW, & J. GRUTH, THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGi0T MoIL.-
IZATION AND LEGITIMATION (1983). The Court impliedly acknowledged this phenomenon in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769-70
(1986).
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decreed right to abortion on demand.
As noted, it is problematic for a legislature to deal with incendi-
ary social problems: even a legislative body has an obligation to
"test the credentials ' 71 of a popular morality to assure that it is
not a tool of genuine injustice and oppression. But even Professor
Dworkin has not urged that Lord Devlin's populist voter (the man
on the Clapham bus)17 2 should have his sentiments on matters of
sexual morality altogether disregarded and his social order restruc-
tured to suit the tastes of a "moral elite."'"
Difficult as this concern for realpolitik may be for a legislative
body, it is more difficult for an institution that purports to enforce
rights by a principled process. Principles can be negotiated, but
can also be lost in the process. As Owen Fiss has taught us, there
are troubling consequences to a system of bargaining over funda-
mental rights.1 74 If, then, it is perilous to allow bargaining over
fundamental constitutional rights, caution must be exercised in in-
truding constitutionalism and declarations of fundamental rights
into an arena of conflict in which bargaining is an advantageous
instrument of governance."'
Also important, as Mary Ann Glendon has observed,' 7 is that
legislative solutions lack finality. They invite continued discourse
between political disputants. If the accommodation made by the
senators is displeasing to their constituents, those constituents
may work a little harder at the next election and hope that the
next legislative session will be more sensitive to their concerns. Ju-
dicial declarations of constitutional right are, to be sure, likewise
not fixed in stone, but they provide no outlet for the energies of
citizens who want them to be changed. Those who lose in court are
171 Dworkin, supra note 139, at 1001.
172 P. DEvuN, supra note 107, at 15.
13 Dworkin, supra note 139, at 1002.
1" Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (questioning whether the alterna-
tive dispute resolution and settlement which is encouraged by the powers given to federal
judges under FED. R. Crv. P. 16 will lead to just results in certain fundamental rights cases).
75 To invert Fiss, courts are unsuited to this task because they are "ideologically commit-
ted [and] institutionally suited to search for the [true] meaning of constitutional values,
.---[and do not] see their primary function in terms of registering the actual occurent pref-
erences of the people-what they want and what they believe should be done." Fiss, supra
note 148, at 10.
1" B. MoyaRs, A WoPLD op ID.As 470-84 (1989) (account of interview between Moyers
and Glendon that appeared in PBS television broadcast of A World of Ideas).
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told, essentially once and for all, that their ideas and values are not
to be expressed in the law of the state or nation. This can be, and
perhaps has been, deeply alienating. As Glendon informs us, par-
liamentary resolution of these issues in Europe has served to keep
divergent sexual moralities in more tolerant relationships to one
another.17
Sixth, it is also relevant, if never controlling, that acutely unwel-
come sexual regulation can often be evaded in the manner of those
who vote with their feet. We have in fact had much experience in
recent decades with transiency of individuals avoiding the lash of
laws seeking to regulate sexual conduct. Nevada is out in front on
easy divorce and prostitution,'1 8 but many states provide sanctuar-
ies for sexual conduct that other states proscribe. On account of
our mobility, Roe v. Wade may be almost unnecessary to make
abortion available to all American women on demand.' Only the
regulation (or absence of regulation) of unwelcome sex at the work-
place seems to be resistant to the evasions of transiency. The
power of any state over the sexual behavior of its citizens is thus in
fact limited by the ability of citizens to avoid the enforcement of
such laws.8 0 In such contexts, the state is weak and the need for
judicial control of legislative excess is lessened.
For all these reasons, and despite the limits of the wisdom avail-
able to state legislatures, it is they who must generally assume pri-
mary responsibility for the management of sexual matters. Given
these features of the law of sexual mores, our courts should not
aspire to a high profile in such matters. 8' It seems unlikely that
they will. Sexual revolution led by judges is not in prospect.
177 K. GLENDON, supra note 64, at 18 (suggesting that while French abortion legislation
might be condemned for allowing abortion, the result has been a political compromise that
has stopped the high level of turmoil that existed before the legislation was passed).
178 Note, Right of Privacy Challenges to Prostitution Statutes, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 439, 472-
80 (1980) (surveying the statutory positions of the fifty states on the matter of prostitution).
17 The Court almost acknowledged as much. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973)
(noting that at the time of the decision about one-third of the states had adopted liberal
abortion statutes).
"' Glendon explains that the divorce law reform that swept the United States reflected in
part the inability of more conservative states to resist the competitive pressure created by
"liberal" states sanctioning the "quickie" divorce. M. GLENDON, supra note 64, at 105.
181 Note that some of the considerations identified here are less applicable where the state
court judges are elected and subject themselves to accountability at the ballot box.
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XI. PROCEDURE AND SEXUAL LAWMAKING
Nevertheless, courts do have an appropriate role to play in sex-
ual matters. It is a modest role, one that engages courts not in
resolving ponderous moral questions, but rather narrower issues
involving the proper functioning of our institutions. These are is-
sues at which American courts are genuinely expert, and their use
of that expertise to prod and cajole the other branches of govern-
ment is well-established and well-accepted.
I have in mind two kinds of issues of process that seem espe-
cially appropriate for constitutional adjudication. There may be
more.
One role is to constrain executive branch enforcement of laws
bearing on sexual conduct. An important judicial function is to as-
sure that the procedure employed to deal with sexual offenses,
whether civil or criminal, is appropriate to the substantive matters
at hand. Particularly with regard to criminal prosecutions for sex-
ual offenses whose only identifiable victim is the public, it is an
important function of courts to insist that all the procedural cor-
ners be cut square. In the criminal context as well as the civil, pro-
cedure is servant to substance. In a time of foment regarding our
sexual mores, a prosecutor should proceed well within the limits
and not at the margins of discretion conferred by a statute, and an
appropriate function of the court is to see that this restraint is
observed.
Thus, for example, in a sodomy prosecution, a court is right to
insist that evidence be gathered by methods that are scrupulously
respectful of the police etiquette prescribed by the Constitution. In
doing so, a court can draw on the holding of Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,182 a decision animated by similar concerns for process: the
Connecticut birth control statute failed in part because there was
no constitutionally valid method to gather evidence of its
violation. 1 3
In insisting on procedural nicety, courts may incidentally estab-
lish a de facto constitutional law protecting homosexual behavior
's' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485-86. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred confines of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notion of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id.
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between consenting adults in private.""' Nothing in Bowers v.
Hardwick 5 prevents, or even discourages such a development of
law constraining investigations of sodomy that reach into the bed-
rooms of citizens. A court regulating invasive police work is se-
curely on its own turf and only incidentally involved in the making
of sexual policy that it is unfit to make.
Such inarticulate constitutionalization of "gay rights" is just the
kind of political accommodation at which our judiciary is most ad-
ept. Such procedural restraints should be congenial to any sound
judge, whether Libertarian, Socialist, Tory or Populist, for they do
not require even the judge to advance or to approve of the mores
of the accused. All can appreciate that the law must be especially
scrupulous in dealing with matters of such delicacy.
A second function of the judiciary is to assure that state legisla-
tures perform their functions in accommodating or synthesizing di-
verse sexual politics. Legislative deadlock can properly occasion a
measured judicial response designed to set the legislative wheels
back on track. Roe v. Wade offers an illustration of this judicial
function, although it was not performed in that case. The Texas
statute challenged in Roe v. Wade was quite old s6 and rested on
the false premise that abortion was highly dangerous to the preg-
nant patient.1 8 7 The courts could in that case have read the statute
to apply only to dangerous abortions, thus remanding to the Texas
legislature the question of its application to relatively safe abor-
tions. The result in the case would have been the same, but the
opinion of the Court would simply have proclaimed that if the
Texas legislature meant to prevent safe abortions, and thereby
raise a significant constitutional issue, it would have to say so more
directly. Such a decision would have been amply legitimate, and
resolution of the politically sensitive moral issue would have re-
mained the responsibility of persons elected by the people of Texas
to decide what kind of society will be maintained in Texas and
I"' This was the recommendation of the WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 93, at 187-89,
and became the law of Great Britain in 1967. Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, ch. 60.
.85 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
186 TEXAS PENAL CODE OF 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-36.
187 410 U.S. at 151 n.48 (Court noted the few state courts interpreting abortion laws dur-
ing late 19th and early 20th centuries focused on pregnant woman's health rather than on
preserving embryo and fetus). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 180 (1973) (noting that
prior to 1968 Act, abortion in Georgia was not criminal if to preserve life of the mother).
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what sorts of persons Texans will be.
Such a "remand to the legislature" is not novel in our experi-
ence, 188 especially where constitutional issues can be avoided.1 89 As
Mary Ann Glendon reports, this is what was done by the West
German Constitutional Court in its 1975 decision affirming the
rights of the fetus to be protected from ill-considered abortion.190
Indeed it may be that Roe v. Wade may yet be read in this way,
for the Court was careful to leave some room for legislative
choice.1 91
Such accommodation, perhaps cowardly, would not satisfy every-
one, especially Sexual Libertarians, because it will leave them to
struggle and negotiate for their moral program in the chambers of
the legislature. But there, in the legislature, the Tories and Social-
ists and Populists will have their day on the issues of sexual moral-
ity, and in a democracy they are entitled to that day.19 2
XII. CONCLUSION
Having espoused so many views, these musings of an old nudity
lawyer should conclude as a traditional Fourth of July speech.
Such a speech would come trippingly off the tongue of my fifth
senator who waives the flag at every troubling issue and thereby
avoids discussing their solutions.
Imagine his remarks delivered on a hot summer evening, in the
park, from a bandstand suitably draped in bunting. The home
team won. The hot dogs were roasted. The iced watermelons were
sliced. The Roman candles were fired. The brass band has pro-
vided the appropriate John Philip Sousa fanfare. Now it is time for
1"I Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HaRv. L REv. 1, 35, 38-39 (1957) (advocating as legitimate function of the courts
the power to "remand" cases to legislatures in certain instances).
1 189 United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909) (Court's duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions if such questions can be
avoided).
19I K GLENDON, supra note 64, at 33-34.
191 410 U.S. 153-54 (affirming state's right to pass some laws affecting a woman's abortion
choice and recognizing that state can sometimes appropriately regulate in areas protected by
right to privacy).
181 Accord M. GLENDON, sdpra note 64, at 54-62. This conclusion bears a resemblance to
that tendered in Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes,
73 COLUM. L REv. 1227 (1973) (discussing constitutional law as basis for equal educational
opportunity in America).
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everyone, even the dogs and children, to stretch out on the grass to
hear the candidates for county commissioner and sheriff and state
senator do their thing.
With all such hopefuls, our fifth senator might be heard to say:
"I stand with you today for the individual rights we all cherish as
Americans. Indeed, I stand also with you for the rights of every
individual and group of individuals to equal rights under the law.
And I stand as well for the American family and for all those rights
necessary and proper for the protection of the family. And finally,
I stand foursquare for the democratic right of the people through
their elected representatives to decide how our cherished individ-
ual rights, and our prized right to equality, and our rights essential
to protect our families shall be reconciled and enforced."
After such a red, white and blue peroration, I for one would go
debate these issues with the children present. I encourage readers
to do the same.
